

100 Mile Creek Fire

AK-MID-000100



Photo Courtesy: Donna Thompson

June 10 – June 20, 2014

Alaska Type 1 IMT

Tony Doty, Incident Commander

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Key Decisions

The following key decisions were identified in the IMT In-briefing and implemented prior to mobilization of the IMT:

- The Alaska Type 1 IMT was ordered when complexity increased.
- The decision was made to go direct when weather conditions changed.
- The decision was made to use crews to hold line instead of heavy equipment.

Daily updates to the Military Zone FMO created a discussion forum on IMT progress toward meeting and implementing the direction and objectives in the Delegation of Authority and WFDSS. The IMT provided a Transition Plan to relay these key decisions to the Type 3 organization with whom they transitioned. Other key decisions were documented and implemented as part of the June 14 WFDSS Decision. Specific key decisions related to the objectives they addressed are documented in bullets below.

Incident Objectives

Throughout most of the IMT's tenure on the fire, the incident objectives were to:

- 1. Implement a sound risk management process that maintains the highest regard for firefighter and public safety.**
 - The IMT deployed no ground resources on military lands due to concerns about UXO.
 - A DoD Shadow Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) was deployed to monitor the Military portion of the fire in order to reduce risk and costs.
 - The southern portion of the fire on military lands was allowed to burn into natural barriers in order to avoid unnecessary exposure of firefighters to risk.
 - Air Operations coordinated with the Air Force in order to deconflict Red Flag Exercise and Incident airspaces.
- 2. Protect values at risk, including infrastructure at military observation points, structures along the Richardson Clearwater River, permitted cabins, Southbank residences and timber resources on State lands.**
 - Burnouts around the military observation points were completed prior to the IMT's arrival at the incident. The IMT continued to monitor the sites aurally with the assistance of the Shadow UAV.
 - Assessment resources from the 100 Mile Fire did extensive mapping, inventory, and protection layout for authorized cabins on State lands and structures in the Richardson Clearwater and South Bank areas. This information has been made available to the Military Zone of AFS and Delta Area Forestry in electronic format.



- Direct tactics on the northern edge of the fire limited damage to timber resources identified by the Alaska Division of Forestry.
 - Structure assessment data and Known Sites data for structures in the fire area was collected, updated, and provided to AFS and Delta Area.
- 3. Minimize fire spread to the north on State lands and contain the fire east of Delta Creek and west of the 2013 Mississippi burn.**
- Hand crews, supported by aerial resources, constructed and secured direct saw line east from Delta Creek along the northern edge of the fire, and tied in to the Mississippi burn on the west.
 - NIROPS IR and aggressive mop-up standards were used to reduce the potential for a Chinook event later in the season to threaten the northern containment line.
- 4. Protect anadromous fish habitat in the Richardson Clearwater and Delta River drainages from the effects of fire as well as from the effects of fire suppression efforts.**
- Although the use of dozers was discussed at the in-brief, the IMT was able to meet objectives with hand-line and saw-line. There was no line constructed nearer than 2.5 miles to waters identified in the anadromous catalog.
 - The winter road, which had been widened with 'walk-down' during the 2013 Mississippi fire, required no further improvement for use as a contingency line.
 - Contingency structure protection pump sites were identified in the Richardson-Clearwater but were never used. All pump sites were prepared and equipped in accordance with the Statewide Fish Habitat Permit FH14-SW-0002.
 - The IMT ordered a Resource Advisor to validate the Incident Suppression Repair Plan.
- 5. Effectively communicate timely and accurate fire information to residents, media, and stakeholders.**
- Community meetings were held and information boards were established in Delta Junction.
 - Inciweb and the IMT Facebook page were maintained by the incident.
 - The IMT Liaison Officer initiated a meeting with the Delta City Council and maintained key contacts with military personnel at Fort Greely.
 - The IMT coordinated with the Alaska Department of Fish and Game regarding bear issues.
- 6. Work with agency administrators to integrate cost management strategies into strategic and tactical decisions consistent with risk management, values, and social factors.**
- The southern portion of the fire on military lands was allowed to burn into natural barriers in order to avoid unnecessary exposure of firefighters to risk, as well as to reduce costs.
 - Direct handline tactics on the northern edge of the fire, instead of the use of heavy equipment, lowered suppression costs and greatly reduced the need for costly suppression repair.



Incident Overview

The 100 Mile Creek Fire was declared on May 13 at 15:30 when a one acre spot from the Oklahoma Prescribed Fire became established north of 100 Mile Creek in the Donnelly Training Area, near Delta Junction. A Type 3 organization was established to manage the fire. Over the next few weeks, personnel worked to hold the fire on military lands and protect military assets in its path. On June 4th, due to the discovery of UXO, all resources disengaged from direct line construction on military lands and began to scout fireline north of the Military/State Lands boundary. By June 6th, crews had established spike camps and initiated construction of indirect line north of the fire on State lands beyond the threat of UXO. This line would extend from Delta Creek on the west to the 2013 Mississippi fire on the east. Military personnel also arrived that day in preparation of UAS operations in support of the fire.

On June 7th, the fire was pushed north by low RH values coupled with south winds, causing it to escape the military restricted area and burn onto State Full Fire Management Option lands and threaten numerous values. The fire burned to the indirect line and slopped over in several places where it was held with the help of retardant tankers, CL-215s, and helicopters. SMJs were inserted into the Richardson-Clearwater area to begin structure assessment. By June 8th, the fire had grown to 19,543 acres with 290 personnel assigned. The complexity surpassed the capacity of a Type 3 organization and the Alaska Type 1 IMT was ordered. The following day, most of the IMT members gathered in Fairbanks for the June 10th 0800 in-briefing.

The fire was 5% contained when the Alaska Type 1 Incident Management Team assumed command of the fire on June 11th. The team set up ICP at the Delta Fairgrounds. SMJs were in the process of assessing and prepping structures. Crews supported by air resources took advantage of moderated weather and fire behavior to begin constructing direct fireline. Lack of access into military restriction areas (impact zones) hindered operations on the southern portion of the fire. Structures in the Richardson-Clearwater area and military assets in the 100 Mile Creek area remained at risk. Creeping and occasional torching were observed, especially in the northeast and southeast corners of the fire. Two jet-loads of crews from the L48 had been ordered, and one arrived that day and was helicoptered into the fire area. A public meeting was held at 1800 in Delta.

On June 12th, the second jet-load of crews arrived from the L48 and was inserted. At that time, a total of 623 resources were engaged in the management of this fire. The fire had grown to 21,046 acres and the northern portion of the fire receiving full suppression was approximately 50% contained. Low relative humidity and gusty winds tested areas of completed line. Crews supported by helicopters and CL-215s continued to make good progress securing line and began mop-up activities. The OP sites on the south end of the fire were monitored by air in coordination with the military. Structure assessment expanded to include homes in South Bank along the Tanana River.

Between June 13th and June 15th, the fire progressed in areas of black spruce, mostly on the southeast end of the fire. Smoldering was observed throughout the interior in hardwood stands. Weather was generally intermittently cloudy skies with gusty winds, isolated showers, and a few thunderstorms. On June 13th, 0.1 to 0.2 inches of precipitation helped to moderate fire behavior. Crews supported by



helicopters continued to secure line, burn out pockets of fuel, and mop-up adjacent fuels. The Clearwater Structure group reported additional values at risk discovered during assessments. NIROPS IR was acquired for the entire perimeter, including the military restricted lands. This information, combined with a GPS mapping mission, showed the fire had grown to 21,846 acres. Two low-value military assets were reported as destroyed and another public meeting was held in Delta. As of June 15th, 72% of the State portion of the fire was reported as contained.

On June 16th, a low pressure system in the Gulf of Alaska brought winds from the south, gusting to 40 mph, over the fire. These winds were anticipated and caused a Red Flag Warning to be issued by the National Weather Service earlier in the day. Along with the winds came a severe drop in relative humidity. Between the early morning hours when the wind began picking up and late afternoon, humidity dropped 60 percentage points, finally reaching around 23%. This weather event was similar to the weather that moved the fire rapidly north on Saturday, June 7th, but this time crews and CL-215s were able to hold the fire at established control lines. After several loads, the aircraft were diverted to help control a new lightning fire on Chena Hot Springs Road. The only place that the fire spread was on the southeast flank. Growth in this area is limited by the fire scar from the 2013 Mississippi Fire and posed no threat to values. The windy day proved to be a good “test” for suppression efforts. It also exposed heat in several interior islands of fuel that were subsequently targeted for mop-up by the IMT.

On June 16 100% containment of the portion of the fire on State lands was achieved. With little additional opportunities available for direct action due to restrictions on military lands, and with additional cool and rainy weather in the forecast, demobilization of resources began in earnest. Structure protection was removed from all values. The first jet-load of L48 crews was released. A READ was assigned from Tok Area Forestry and began work on the State lands Suppression Repair Plan. The fire encompassed 23,270 acres with 403 personnel assigned.

On June 17th, smoldering fire behavior picked up around 1600 due to strong pre-frontal winds. Group torching was observed in unburned spruce islands, and increased activity was indicated by smoke visible on the southeast end of the fire. Crews continued to strengthen and mop-up the northern line. The second jet-load of L48 crews and additional overhead were released. The Resource Advisor continued with his fireline repair assessment. The portion of the fire on military lands continued to be monitored from the air. An IR mapping report did not show any increase in fire size; all identified heat sources were interior. A member of the Alaska Management Team Search and Rescue shadowed the IMT.

From June 18th – 19th, more than 3.0 inches of rain was recorded over the fire area, significantly decreasing fire behavior. Additional crews were demobilized and the Type 1 IMT prepared to transition to a Type 3 organization. The suppression repair plan for work on State Lands was completed. One crew was left in place to strengthen the north line and begin suppression repair work. As of June 19th, the fire had burned 23,270 acres; 16,407 on military, and 6,863 on State lands. The IMT transferred command to a Type 3 Organization on June 20th. Full containment (100%) was achieved on the portion of the fire on State lands; however, containment of the military portion is not expected until a season-ending event



occurs. There remains a long-range low probability of threat to the values on State lands north of the fire.

Personnel from multiple agencies, Tok Area Forestry, US Air Force, US Army, Department of Defense, and National Weather Service assisted with fire management efforts. Infrared detection by a DOD satellite supplemented aerial mapping and helped to identify hotspots and areas of heat on the fire. The US Army Taskforce Wolverine, Shadow UAS Command Center originally set up with the Type 3 Organization at Arkansas Helibase. They re-located to the Alaska Type 1 IMT ICP on June 13th. Their Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) was used to provide heat source information and images of the OP sites in the Military Restricted Area.

The US Air Force initiated its "Red Flag" Exercise within the R2202 Restricted Area on Monday, June 16th. Aircraft associated with the exercise operated in the area throughout the remainder of the IMT's tenure. Deconfliction of incident and exercise airspace was achieved through the use of an airspace coordinator, and there were minimal impacts to incident aviation operations.

Fire Weather

Summary

Dynamic weather dominated the weather pattern the week before deployment. The majority of the fire's acreage gains occurred May 31st and June 7th. The conditions of May 31st were that of a strong Chinook wind, bringing strong winds and very low relative humidity to the area. A series of weather systems moved over the area the first several days of June, bringing occasional light rain to the area and occasionally gusty winds. June 7th saw low relative humidity values into the upper 20s to lower 30s which combined with strong southeast winds to result in another day of substantial fire growth.

The dynamic weather pattern continued as the Alaska Type 1 IMT arrived at the ICP Tuesday afternoon June 10th. An upper level low had moved into the Gulf of Alaska, and southeasterly to easterly flow brought moisture and lift from the Yukon west into the area. A wetting rain fell Wednesday June 11th with most of the incident receiving around 0.25" of rain. West winds developed and peaked at 11 mph with gusts to 20 mph at the Oklahoma RAWs. Scattered showers were common in the morning and in the afternoon, with one shower in the afternoon over the fire producing a cool, weak outflow toward the ICP.

A dry and calm day Thursday the 12th gave way to increasing winds Thursday night into Friday the 13th, with strong winds out of Isabel Pass to 35 mph. Lighter winds with gusts to 20 mph over the fire itself brought humidity values down into the 20s by early afternoon. Increasing cloud cover and somewhat unexpected shower development with easterly flow resulted in rainfall accumulations to 0.02" on the northeast side of the fire and 0.11" on the south side.

Another wave moved into the area Saturday morning the 14th and brought another round of light showers. High pressure ridging moved south toward the fire area and resulted in abrupt clearing from north to south during the mid-morning hours. By 1300 Saturday cumulus clouds were already



developing along the thermal trough just to the north of Big Delta, and thunderstorms had developed by 1500 and were moving south and west across the area. Most of the area received a decent wetting rain nearing 0.20 to 0.25". However, the portable RAWS on the northeast side of the fire only received 0.01" in the afternoon with the showers and thunderstorms.

Sunday the 15th began warm and sunny, but cumulus clouds were already forming into light showers before midday. A mid-level cap, or warm stable layer in the mid-levels of the atmosphere, prevented showers from developing into thunderstorms. The precipitation that resulted brought no more than a trace across the area.

Monday the 16th brought the most critical fire weather conditions of the deployment. Red Flag conditions developed around noon as strong south winds out of Isabel Pass and southeasterly gap winds out of the Tanana Valley combined to bring gusts generally around 25 mph to the fire area, with higher gusts along the Delta River and near the Helibase to 45 mph. Winds diminished to 20 mph in gusts during the mid- to late evening hours, but humidity values remained below 30 percent through midnight before recovering towards the morning of Tuesday the 17th to around 60 percent.

Tuesday the 18th was another critical weather day, but not as severe as Monday, with winds gusting from the east and southeast as high as 20 to 25 mph, but with minimum humidity values bottoming out near 30 percent. More severe conditions did occur closer to Isabel Pass, where gusts were 30 to 40 mph. As the afternoon progressed, clouds began to thicken from the south and east as a strong upper level low formed over SE Alaska near the Alcan border and began moving toward the area. Light rain developed around 1900 and continued through the evening. The upper level low began to stall just to the north and east of the fire Tuesday night into Wednesday the 18th.

Moderate rain developed in the early morning hours Wednesday, falling at rates of 0.1"/ hr for several hours. This moderate rain lessened somewhat late in the morning but continued steady into the afternoon hours. 24-hr rainfall totals as of 1900 on the 18th had reached 1.43 inches at AK Portable #3 on the north side of the fire, 1.30 inches at Oklahoma, 1.74 Delta Junction/Fort Greely Airport and just under 2 inches at ICP.

Rainfall is expected to continue steadily through Thursday the 19th with little change in intensity, ending overnight Thursday night. Friday the 20th has the potential to be warmer and relatively dry, with scattered showers. More showers are expected Saturday the 21st into Sunday the 22nd, with winds increasing from the south Saturday night through Sunday night and becoming gusty at times.



Fire Behavior

Summary

Topography

The fire is located on alluvial deposits from the Delta River and Delta Creek. In general the fire slopes gently to the north, starting at 1500' at the south end down to the low spot at the northeast corner at 1050' elevation. There is a hill that protrudes 200-250 feet above the flats at the north end of the fire. Many pothole lakes at the south end of the fire and a string of pothole lakes near the north end of the fire break up the vegetation. The eastern Alaska Range to the South has peaks in the 12-13,000 foot range with Mt. Hayes being the tallest at 13,832 feet. Isabel Pass is a feature that frequently funnels Chinook winds from the south into the Delta River Drainage

Fuels

Primary fuels carrying the fire were black and white spruce (C2), tundra grass (O1b), and mixed hardwoods (M2, 50% conifer, 50% hardwood). Spruce along Delta Creek and the Delta River are caked with silt and it appears to have a fire retardant effect, making the thresholds for burning much higher than spruce away from the river corridors.

North of the fire is the primary area of concern as the majority of the fuels are the black spruce that exhibit the most extreme fire behavior in Alaska. To the east of the fire, most of the fuels were consumed in the 2013 Mississippi fire and are not in a burnable state until vegetation returns. To the southeast of the fire, the Oklahoma range prescribed fire removed vegetation and created a large fuelbreak for the year. To the southwest of the fire, the fuels are mostly brush, hardwoods, and tundra broken up by the pothole lakes with a few small stands of spruce mostly limited to the riparian edge along water bodies. To the west, the fire is bordered by Delta Creek with lingering stringers of silt laden spruce between the fire and Delta Creek.

Fire Weather Indices and Spread

The incident started on May 13, 2014 when spot fires from the Oklahoma Range prescribed fire were converted to a wildfire. The spot fires did not grow much until May 31 when wind and dry conditions caused the fire to move over the Op road where firefighters had attempted to slow spread by conducting a burnout earlier. An additional large acreage growth occurred on June 7 on a dry, but not particularly windy, day after firefighters were forced to forego direct attack efforts due to the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO). The table below highlights index values and 1400 weather observations for the Oklahoma (OKL) remote weather station (RAWS) on days when large spread events that were not planned burnouts occurred.



Date	Air temperature F	Relative Humidity %	Wind Speed MPH	Precipitation inches	Fine Fuel Moisture Code (FFMC)	Duff Moisture Code (DMC)	Drought Code (DC)	Initial Spread Index (ISI)	Buildup Index (BUI)	Fire Weather Index (FWI)
06-19	53	80	2	1.17	17.3	4.5	221.7	0	8.5	0
06-18	46	94	5	1.15	18.9	9.5	304.3	0	17.6	0
06-17	65	33	8	0	89.8	25.8	408.7	7.9	44.6	17.8
06-16	70	27	12	0	87.9	22.4	402	8.4	39.3	17.4
06-15	67	45	9	0.26	67	18.1	394.8	1.2	32.5	2.3
06-14	66	44	13	0.19	73.6	26.6	410.4	2.1	45.7	5.8
06-13	65	30	9	0	88.8	36.1	418.6	7.5	59.4	19.8
06-12	63	27	6	0	80.7	32.5	411.9	2	54.3	6.3
06-11	52	54	5	0.25	53.3	29	405.4	0.4	49.2	0.6
06-10	60	46	5	0	78.6	45.7	422	1.5	71.9	5.8
06-09	56	69	2	0.12	61.8	43.3	415.8	0.5	68.7	1.5
06-08	68	42	8	0	91.2	53.7	417	9.7	81.2	27.9
06-07	73	17	8	0	93.9	50.4	410	14.2	77.1	35
06-06	68	28	6	0	89.4	45.2	402.5	6.4	70.6	19.3
06-05	62	50	12	0	81	41.2	395.5	3.4	65.4	11.3
06-04	61	38	5	0	64.4	38.9	389.1	0.8	62.2	2.5
06-03	47	81	3	0.48	26.6	36.1	382.8	0	58.4	0
06-02	41	91	10	0.1	57.8	72.3	425.4	0.8	101.4	3.9
06-01	51	37	3	0	91.1	89.8	421.1	6.4	117.2	25
05-31	60	18	17	0	92.7	87.9	415.8	25.1	115	60.1
05-30	60	41	13	0	90.4	84.3	410.6	13	111.4	39.4
05-29	69	25	5	0	92.2	81.7	405.4	8.8	108.6	30
05-28	68	25	6	0	91.7	77.4	399.3	8.9	104.3	29.8
05-27	60	33	5	0	89.6	73.3	393.2	6.1	100	22.4
05-26	61	33	3	0.01	89.2	70.3	388	4.9	96.8	18.7
05-25	49	57	9	0	87.5	67.3	382.7	6.2	93.5	22
05-24	59	25	2	0	90.6	66.1	378.6	5.5	92	19.9
05-23	55	34	5	0	88.8	62.9	373.5	5.4	88.5	19.2
05-22	51	29	10	0	87.9	60.5	368.8	7.1	85.8	23.1
05-21	54	31	7	0	83.1	58.3	364.5	2.9	83.3	11.5
05-20	45	51	8	0.09	68.9	55.9	359.9	1.2	80.5	4.9
05-19	45	48	12	0	81.2	63.9	356.2	3.4	88.3	13.6
05-18	48	39	17	0.12	73.4	62.8	352.5	2.8	86.9	11.5
05-17	65	34	6	0	91.5	80	354.5	8.6	102.3	28.8
05-16	66	27	11	0	91.4	76.6	348.8	12.8	98.9	37
05-15	63	21	6	0	90.6	72.8	343	7.6	95.1	25.4
05-14	57	23	4	0	83.3	69	337.5	2.3	91.3	10.2
05-13	42	88	11	0.08	65.9	65.9	332.6	1.3	88.2	6.1
05-12	69	18	5	0	93.6	74.3	329.2	10.8	95	32.3
05-11	64	21	6	0	92.2	69.7	323.1	9.5	90.5	29
05-10	53	27	10	0	89.9	65.7	317.4	9.5	86.6	28.3

Figure 1: Oklahoma RAWS (OKL) Fire Weather Indices 5/10-6/19

Winds out of the south, spotting across existing firelines, and a lack of ability for firefighters to engage the fire (due to high winds or UXO concerns) are common factors on fire growth days on the 100 Mile Creek Fire. Historically, fire growth is associated with Chinook wind events in the fire area and all historic large fire perimeters in the area show a strong tendency to grow to the north as a result. Fire growth on 6/7 was not associated with particularly strong winds for the area and that is likely why



firefighting efforts were successful in an area with a fuel type change and many lakes lined up to break up fuel continuity.

The Alaska Type 1 Team assumed command on Wednesday June 11. From that time to June 17 potential for fire spread to the north existed, especially during high wind and low RH days on June 16 and 17. Firefighter suppression efforts were successful in halting the fire's spread to the north for the entire assignment until June 18 when a significant multiple-inch rain event occurred. Observed fire behavior varied, but included smoldering, torching, group torching, and small runs through the crowns of spruce stands. Where the fire was free to burn in a 150 acre stand of spruce near the SE corner of the fire, crown-fire was observed on June 13. Otherwise, the fire activity was mostly confined to interior islands of fuel and isolated areas of heat along the south, southeast and western perimeter where fuel type and fuelbreaks limited fire's ability to spread.

Notable Successes

Putting the portable RAWs near the area of concern on the north of the fire really allowed us to understand the weather, fuels, and fire behavior at the place where it mattered.

Significant Challenges and Resolutions

The incident meteorologists did have trouble ordering helium (for use in launching a radiosonde via balloon) through the ordinary channels. After a couple days of questions, the issue was resolved. The answer to the issue was to use Google to find a vendor in Fairbanks (Air Liquide). There were no other challenges of significance.

Command

Incident Commander

Mobilization

On June 7, the Alaska Type 1 Incident Management Team (IMT) was notified of an order for a long team to transition from a Type 3 organization on the 100 Mile Creek Fire in the Military Zone. Two weeks prior to the order, the Type 1 IMT had been unable to meet the criteria to field a national team and was statused as unavailable on the national Type 1 IMT rotation due to numerous primary members being assigned with Rob Allen's Alaska Type 2 IMT on the Funny River Fire in Soldotna, Alaska. The Type 1 IMT had originally been requested for a Monday, June 9 delivery, however the timing of the Funny River Fire's demob required numerous Type 1 IMT members to have mandatory days off prior to the 100 Mile Creek mobilization. Subsequently, the IC and Section Chiefs were unable to notify many alternates, which delayed the original request time by one day. The AICC Overhead Desk was instrumental in facilitating "pool" selection and coordination of the Type 1 roster; however, the timing of the Funny River demob and communications issues with IMT members resulted in some roster lapses and notification delays.

Many IMT members were already embedded in the 100 Mile Creek suppression activity as part of the Type 3 organization. Additional IMT operations and logistics section personnel were instructed to proceed directly to the fire in advance of the IMT to supplement the Type 3 organization and prepare for



the IMT's arrival. The remainder of the IMT was in-briefed on Tuesday, June 10, 2014 and arrived at the 100 Mile Creek ICP (Deltana Fairgrounds, Delta Junction, Alaska) that afternoon.

Delegation of Authority and Transfer of Command

The US Army Garrison - Fort Wainwright, the BLM - Alaska Eastern Interior Field Office, and BLM - Alaska Fire Service - Military Zone issued a Delegation of Authority for management of the 100 Mile Creek Fire to Incident Commander, Tony Doty. The delegation provided the IMT with clear direction and the IMT transferred command with the Type 3 organization at 0600 AKDT on June 11th. The main focus was to protect values at risk on State and private lands north of the fire, including residential areas in the Richardson Clearwater, South Bank, Clear Creek, and Whitestone communities; three communication towers within the northeastern portion of the Planning Area; recreational cabins; anadromous fish habitat; and timber stands. Military assets including Observation Points, Impacts to Red Flag Exercise, and additional Impact Areas west to Delta Creek and south of the current fire perimeter were also at risk. The Delegation transferred responsibility for adhering to the objectives, requirements, and courses of action as established in the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) Decision approved on June 10.

WFDSS

The initial WFDSS and revised WFDSS were adequate to determine the concerns and requirements of published signers. The WFDSS required the IMT to work with the assigned Resource Advisor(s) (READ) to coordinate concerns regarding federally protected species, cultural and natural resources, and critical military infrastructure/assets. Initial attempts to obtain a READ were unsuccessful; however, a READ was eventually assigned on June 16.

The WFDSS projected cost in the IMT's original decision was expected to exceed the threshold of \$4.5M. On June 13, a meeting was held to adjust the WFDSS decision. Based on the mobilization costs and the anticipated suppression activities required to meet the objectives, the threshold was increased to \$8.5M. The revised WFDSS decision was approved on June 14.

Significant Events

Significant events that occurred during the IMT's tenure on the fire included:

- The US Air Force, International Red Flag Exercise which began on June 13 over the southern half of the fire.
- The US Army Task Force Wolverine, Shadow Unmanned Aviation System (UAS) was able to provide imagery in support of requested reconnaissance. Imagery was geo-tagged with "hover-over" capability for use on AVENZA mapping apps for Android and iOS. The UAS Operational Base relocated to 100 Mile ICP to increase coordination in order to provide surveillance products to the IMT.
- Beginning June 16, the IMT provided ICS mentoring opportunities for the Alaska IMT-Search and Rescue.



Dozer Use

The original fire area was located entirely in military land within AFS jurisdiction. Based on ICS 209 data and fire progression, the perimeter was estimated to be 9,397 acres with limited activity. The potential use of dozers to attempt to limit spread to the north onto State lands was discussed with State of Alaska DNR representatives. However, dozer access onto military lands did not seem feasible, and the fire was not moving, so the idea was dropped. On June 7th, a wind event pushed the fire into State land, the Type 1 Team was activated, and the discussion for heavy equipment use for fire suppression again took place between agency representatives. The IMT chose instead to employ hand crews to secure a saw line, establish access, and eventually meet mop-up standards. This was accomplished using 24 crews from both the Lower 48 and Alaska. The end result was minimum environmental damage and elimination of suppression repair needs along the established containment perimeter.

In order to address future concerns, the military, AFS, and State officials should discuss the potential for a fuel break between lands that are used for military training and ordnance activity and state lands valued for timber. This fuel break could best be constructed in winter using heavy equipment on frozen soils when damage would be minimized and access would be maximized.

Known Sites

Known sites collection for the Planning Area was outlined in the original delegation. The area of interest included values on State and private lands including the Richardson Clearwater, South Bank, Whitestone, and permitted cabins. Most of these assets had been previously identified during the 2013 Mississippi Fire. Assessment resources from the 100 Mile Fire did extensive mapping, inventory, and protection layout of the Richardson Clearwater area. This information has been made available to the Military Zone of AFS and Delta Area Forestry in electronic format.

Timber Resources

Delta Area and the State of Alaska's Division of Forestry valued timber resources north of the fire perimeter between \$1 and \$600 million. This wide discrepancy of values made for uncertainty in planning for suppression tactics. Overall, the Delta Area showed no timber sales projected within their five-year schedule for the area immediately north of the fire and east of Delta Creek. Fire crossing over Delta Creek would have far reaching consequences into the timber inventory identified. In addition to the immediate objective of minimizing acres to preserve values to the north, keeping the fire east of Delta Creek remained a priority throughout the duration of IMT involvement.

Human Resources:

Human Resource issues were solved within the immediate Command and General Staff without the addition of a specialist. There were no unresolved issues.

Safety

Summary

There were Three SOFRs (line safety) assigned to the Type 3 organization when transition occurred on June 11, 2014. The Team had two SOF1s and one SOF1 Trainee. Two additional SOFRs were ordered,



and one SOF2. They were assigned to the spike camps. On the first day of the fire a male black bear was shot and killed in Division "E" by one of the shooters assigned to the fire. The appropriate paperwork and the hide and skull were turned in to Alaska Dept. of Fish and Game, and paperwork turned in to the BLM Safety Officer for the District. Another Bear was shot and killed on 06/16/14. As before, all appropriate paperwork, along with hide and skull, were processed. There was one bear shot, but not killed, on 6/17/14 in Division G.

There were a total of 8 reportable injuries. There were 15 visits to the Clinic in Delta, and 259 visits to medics and the ICP medical unit. There was one vehicle accident.

Some unexploded ordnance (UXO) was discovered by the Type 3 organization prior to the arrival of the Type 1 Team, but crews were directed to avoid those areas. No additional ordnance was discovered after the Type 1 Team took control of the fire.

Notable Successes

The Alaska IMT briefed all the incident personnel on the risk management analysis process and sent field size copies of the form to the field for verification of the hazards and the mitigations associated with the incident. We did receive a limited number of forms back, and they did have positive feedback for the process.

Significant Challenges and Resolutions

The definition of an ICS-209 reportable accident was discussed at length by the IMT. The user guide definition is unsatisfactory. The IMT agreed eventually that only "Lost-time" injuries (those injuries where at least one full day of work beyond the day of injury is lost) would be reported.

Liaison

Summary

The Liaison Officer arrived on the incident after the IMT had been in-briefed. The Incident Commander, Tony Doty, and Deputy Incident Commander, Tom Kurth briefed him and brought him up to speed on the current status of the fire and any cooperators issues. The Liaison was co-located with Safety and the PIO staff. He made contacts with various local entities, including City Council members, local citizens, the local Fire Chief, members of the military from Fort Greely, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, and Department of Natural Resource employees, with most being the Division of Forestry, Alaska Fire Service, and the Deltana Corporation. The Liaison attended team planning meetings and twice daily command and general staff meetings, as well as public meetings facilitated by the PIO.

Notable Successes

- From the beginning of the Liaison's first tour with the team he was treated with mutual respect. More importantly many team members went out of their way to be friendly, welcoming and helpful.
- Being collocated with the PIO was very efficient. This kept from duplicating efforts where the two functions tended to overlap. The PIO was a long standing team member and familiar with



local issues and individuals. He was very helpful in getting the Liaison Officer up to speed on these important matters.

- The Liaison was able provide an objective “outsider’s” review of the WFDSS decision.
- The Liaison was also able to review and give input to the IMT’s “Incident Within an Incident Plan” with the Team Safety Officers.
- He also coordinated with the Alaska Department of Fish and Game on behalf of the Safety Officers in regard to a bear kill.
- The Liaison officer attended the Morning Weather Briefing and State Forestry and Alaska Fire Service Operations briefing with the IC and Deputy IC. This improved coordination with Delta Area Division of Forestry and provided opportunities to discuss issues pertinent to the Liaison function.

Significant Challenges and Resolutions

This fire being the result of an escaped prescribed burn on the military impact area has the potential to be controversial. The Liaison coordinated requests for information about this and the Prescribed Burn Plan with the BLM Military Zone FMO and requesting party. This issue has the potential to continue into the future.

Information

Summary

The IMT was deployed with just a Lead and PIO2(t.) These personnel arrived in Delta and went directly to City Hall to establish contact with the City Clerk. In addition to getting contact information for most city officials, they reserved the Community Center for the evenings of June 11 and June 13 for community meetings. After establishing the location of the Information Center at the new ICP, they proceeded to visit the established ICP/Helibase and a number of local businesses and agency offices. The incident Info Center operation proceeded smoothly, albeit staffed at a bare minimum. A PIOF(t) checked in later the first evening. With little fire movement or smoke in town, the section was able to concentrate on keeping the community informed of fire operations. Traplines, both internal and external, were established and maintained. A separate bulletin board that featured TFR information was set up at the Delta Airstrip to help the general aviation community. Most electronic media work was handled by the Zone PIO in Fairbanks since it took time to set up computers and internet in the Info Section. The Lead briefed the Zone PIO several times each day. The Lead briefed the AFS Public Affairs Officer only on specific developments requested.

Notable Successes

- The Community Meetings were very effective for sharing information about the fire and how the IMT was managing it. The fact that few people showed up was interpreted to be a measure of the comfort level of people in Delta and the surrounding communities and, once again, their trust in the Alaska IMT.
- The section furnished newspapers to firefighters staying in spike camps that otherwise had no access to bulletin boards or other information sources.



- Having Information co-located with the Liaison Officer is a logical match.
- Having just a PIO2(t) and PIOF(t) for staff on a Type 1 incident would ordinarily be a risky endeavor. In this case the PIO2(t) was an experienced team member normally deployed as a Medic and the PIOF(t) was an experienced Ops person. They both did an exceptional job and helped the section to excel.
- Having the Zone FMO or AFMO at the community meetings added a lot to the team's credibility in terms of explaining the management of the fire to the public.
- Development of a Communication Strategy was simplified by resurrecting the one from the Mississippi fire last fall and altering just a few details.
- The Team Facebook page and akfireinfo.com were useful for getting the word out. The Info Section launched their Virtual Operations Support Team (VOST) as the team deployed. It was successfully used as a monitoring device and to push a limited amount of information. The Team PIO and the Zone PIO did most of the posting on the IMT Facebook page. Inciweb was also employed.

Significant Challenges and Resolutions

- Having the Safety Officers co-located with the Information Center is not a good idea. In this case there were no significant problems, but the first time there are public visitors in the Info Center and the SOFs get a confidential radio call or begin a medevac, there could be very serious repercussions.
- Having a PIO back in the Zone Office to facilitate electronic communications and media inquiries works well. However, not having the PIO1(t) located with the team, or at least within the chain of command, is not particularly productive. It is suggested that a PIO be assigned to the Zone Office, but that the Info trainee be with the team at the ICP.
- The FEMA-compliant ICS-209 seems unnecessarily complicated and convoluted from a public information perspective. It makes the collection and distribution of facts and statistics about the fire much more difficult to interpret to the public and media.
- The suppression strategy of containing only part of the fire perimeter and then publishing a percentage of how much of the "to be contained" perimeter is completed is very confusing to the public and even cooperators. This will result at some point in showing that the fire is "100% contained" when in fact at least half of the fire perimeter has absolutely no control line on it due to UXO concerns.
- Once again it was challenging to explain to Quartz Lake homeowners that use of the lake for the scoopers was not detrimental to the fishery there. It is suggested that local fire managers meet with Quartz Lake homeowners during the off season to discuss the use of water from this source.



Operations

Summary

Several members of the Operations Section were dispatched directly to the incident on June 10 to shadow the Type 3 organization on the shift prior to transition. Two members of the Type 3 organization were incorporated into the Alaska IMT Operations Section in overhead positions, allowing for a seamless transition. The Type 3 organization had already established sound tactics; the additional Divisions and overhead assisted in building a more manageable span of control.

The 100 Mile Creek Fire made significant acreage gains and demonstrated extreme fire behavior on June 7, 2014, but by June 9, cooler weather and diminishing winds provided the opportunity for direct attack of the fire. Anchor points were established on the East and West flanks of the fire using the 2013 Mississippi fire scar on the east and the Little Delta Creek to the west. Crews were inserted into five spike camps along the northern perimeter to decrease the need for daily helicopter shuttles and increase line production. Air tankers, scoopers and bucket operations were used to check unstaffed fire line until ground resources could be inserted.

The Alaska Type 1 IMT was successful in containing the 100 Mile Creek Fire because of their understanding of suppression operations in Alaska and experience working with Alaskan resources. They were quick to adjust staffing and operational configuration to proceed into Divisions E, G, P, and Clearwater Structure Group while continuing to protect and monitor fire activity in the military restricted divisions. The team maximized suppression efforts to get the job done quickly and adjusted their workforce as inclement weather aided suppression efforts. They had good communication with line supervisors, which aided in efficient remote logistics and line production to complete work assignments and demobilize unnecessary resources.

Air Operations

Summary

The Type 3 incident had a fully functioning Type 1 helibase with seven helicopters; one heavy, three mediums and three lights. Communications had been established using IA frequencies. A large TFR had also been established over the fire area.

As per the in-brief, the USAF Red Flag exercise was scheduled to begin between June 6 and June 13 and run through the last week in June. Doug Gibbs had done considerable work to establish coordination with hosting military branches and had them all present at the in-brief. Aircraft deconfliction was a major concern throughout the incident. On June 11 an Airspace Coordinator was ordered for the incident; this position acted as a liaison with the Air Force, Army, and Range Control. In addition to the Red Flag exercise, there was an Army Shadow UAV group conducting operations in conjunction with the fire (BLM-AFS) providing the incident with thermal imaging.



With the exception of the smokejumpers being supported by boat on the north end of the fire, the incident was totally supported by helicopters. At peak operation there were three mediums, one heavy and three light helicopters providing fire suppression, as well as logistical support, for over 400 personnel in remote spike camps. A night medevac helicopter was maintained throughout the incident.

Notable Successes

- Trainees were used in all positions from HECM to the ABOD
- Implementation of an Airspace Coordinator
- Proactive coordination through the zone with the military prior to the IMT taking over
- Provided helicopter support for over 400 personnel on the incident logistically and tactically
- No intrusions into the TFR
- Vigilant interactive and coordination with the military throughout Red Flag
- Successfully coordinated with the Army's Shadow UAV group and produced heat signature products
- Flew UAVs in both day and night operations
- Operated UAVs south of the restricted area while fire aviation operations were being conducted to the north
- Only five vehicles assigned to the helibase

Significant Challenges and Resolutions

- Potential airspace conflicts/Established an Airspace Coordinator, kept lines of communication open with local military personnel, i.e. range control, radio comms during flight ops.
- UAV program/Work in progress. Possible resolutions: work with UAV group prior to deployment; identify fire personnel to be assigned to the group to guide them in producing usable products for the incident.

Planning

Summary

The IMT shifted the incident Planning Cycle to align better with the burn period. The Operational Period ran from 0800-2400, with an 0900 Operational Briefing. The shift allowed operational resources to work later into the evening when there was still active fire behavior without compromising their 2:1 work to rest ratio.

Situation Unit

The Situation Unit assumed responsibility for the ICS 209s, fire weather forecasts, and incident map products on June 11th, 2013. The Unit was comprised of a SITL, GISS, FBAN, IMET and IMET(t), as well as



a SITL(t) that moved over from the Type 3 organization. A second fully- qualified GISS arrived on June 12th. Both SITLs and helitack personnel were able to complete Field Observer activities, so no additional personnel were ordered.

The rapid development and ongoing improvement of products can be attributed in part to the GIS assistance from AFS, including data layers and pre-built projects, as well as AK IMT records from the Mississippi fire in 2013. Additional information was provided by Military zone personnel, resource specialists during the in-brief, Military Resource Advisor Dan Reece, and Tok Area Forestry Resource Advisor Peter Talus.

The original fire perimeter (6/11) was provided by the Type 3 organization. The fire perimeter was updated multiple times throughout the incident using a combination of GPS data from aerial reconnaissance and IR information (NIROPS). Helibase personnel assisted in perimeter mapping missions.

Current status:

Fire Number	Fire Name	Acres	Containment
00100	100 Mile Creek	23,270	100% of 41% to be contained

Notable Successes

The external drives from the Plans kit and supplied by the PSC1(t) assisted the unit by providing data from the Mississippi fire that occurred one year prior. Initial supplies for the Situation Unit GIS were low. The Palmer warehouse supplied additional paper and ink that was surplus from a previous fire. The plotter (HP T1100PS) performed better overall than other plotters, so the second one was not needed. Utilization of a high speed 11x17 printer/copier was extremely efficient for field map products and removed the need for a separate 11x17 printer.

A Quick Response Code (QR) was developed by the IMT GISS to provide geo-referenced PDF maps to those with smart phones and iPads. The technology was very useful for making digital products available to a wider audience.

A Structure Protection Guide and water handling inventory was developed from maps and equipment lists provided by the SMJ assigned to the Clearwater Group. The Guide is intended as a quick reference for future incident managers and suppression resources and provides initial water handling equipment needs and a structure protection design. Information they gathered will also be used to update the Known Sites database for the Richardson-Clearwater and Southbank areas.

Infrared data was available free to the incident through a DOD satellite and processed through NIROPS. The SITL and SITL(t) were able to request IR through normal channels, and products were uploaded to the NIFC ftp site. The satellite IR was limited by cloud cover, but still useful until Palm IR could be organized. Satellite IR was displayed on a map (including coordinates, if requested) that was supplied to operations personnel.



Significant Challenges and Resolutions

A full day without Internet service was mitigated by use of the IMT RapidCom, Kit Mi-Fis, and individual's mobile hotspots.

The Situation Unit found that a minimum of 2 GISS should be ordered to cover early morning IR information as well as late night map updates that come in post planning meeting and/or from line resources.

There were several issues with the new ICS-209 system, including:

- The system was extremely sluggish when working over slow Internet connections on the first few days of the incident. Without DSL it may be necessary to submit printed reports.
- A bug in the Illness/Injury reporting block that incorrectly counts previous totals on printed versions of the report.
- Known time zone issues with the reporting period fields led to a report being posted a day into the future. The subsequent report also had to be dated incorrectly, as the system would not allow correction or double posting to a period.
- Formatting of PDF reports is poor.

Gabriella Branson and Hudson Plass at AICC were extremely helpful with ICS 209 issues. It is suggested that blank paper and electronic copies be carried by the SITL as a contingency plan for reporting.

The detailed WFDSS Decision document developed by the Agency could easily have derailed the incident Planning Section with a large workload. The Agency ordered a Strategic Planner to develop this document and the incident Planning Section workload was not an issue. This should become standard practice if "Extreme WFDSS" is required in the future.

The plotter arrived without paper and extra ink. Without assistance from the Palmer warehouse, the Situation Unit would not have been able to produce maps for the incident in a timely manner. When the plotter is ordered, it should come with a several-day supply of paper, ink cartridges, and print heads. The case should be checked for supplies before it is shipped to an incident. A standard GIS/SIT Unit initial order has been created and will be included with the IMT initial order in the future.

The "Known Sites" data continues to be a moving target. The Known Sites database housed on the AICC webpage is different than layers that were provided by State Forestry GIS personnel. All known sites data updates and structure protection data collected by the fire are being provided to

- 1.) AFS - Military Zone (email, hard-copy, and on Documentation Package hard-drive)
- 2.) Delta Area Forester (email, hard-copy)
- 3.) AWFCG GIS Committee State Forestry Representative (email)
- 4.) AWFCG GIS Committee AFS Representative (email)



Working with the US Army UAS group proved challenging. The products are potentially valuable, but the missing link seems to be an interpreter that has the technological/GISS skills to transform the information into something more consumable by the IMT and field resources.

Resources Unit

The Resources Unit was staffed with two fully qualified RESLs and one Alaska trainee RESL. Using the I-Suite database, the team checked-in and entered data for over 624 personnel, provided daily IAPs and resource tracking reports.

Notable Successes

The IAP and ICS 209 email contact list was centrally maintained by the RESL (t) on the plans@alaskaimt.com Gmail account. This proved to be an efficient means of maintaining a single list that was accessible by everyone in the Planning Section. In addition, many regular contacts are now stored on the site and will be available to the IMT on other incidents.

Significant Challenges and Resolutions

The original copy machine order was not specific enough and was filled with a copier that was inadequate for IAP production. Plans and Logistics worked with the Buying Team to replace the copier, and added the necessary specificity to the IMT initial order to avoid similar problems in the future.

Demobilization Unit

The Demob Unit formed June 11, 2014, established their goals, set up their workspace, and prepared the Demobilization Plan and assisted Check-In, Resources and Documentation until demobilization started.

Notable Successes

Effective preparation of information needed to expedite Demob, and the interworking relationships with the Resource Unit and the cooperation of all Sections, greatly aided prompt and efficient demobilization.

Significant Challenges and Resolutions

- The Type 3 team had significant personnel still not checked-in, which created a challenge overcome by much leg work.
- There were no working phone or fax lines for four days, causing difficult communications between the unit and Expanded Dispatch and resulting in the use of personal cell phones with no ability to fax or email. Use of a personal cell phone hot-spot and a personal notebook computer for emailing worked with limited success because of limited data time allowed by the carrier.
- Several Resources attempted to check-in without red cards, claiming they had not been issued their cards for the year. The home units had assured them they would not be needed. These were Alaska resources. They were compelled to contact their home unit and have these cards issued and faxed to Check-In. They were qualified for their ordered positions.



Documentation Unit

A Documentation Unit Leader arrived on the 100 Creek Fire on June 12, 2014 and located the Records Retention Kit that had been ordered by the team and was on location in the Plans Shop. The DOCL began organizing the records for the incident following the National guidelines for Records Management and retention. All folders were labeled and placed in their proper sequence in the bins provided with the kit. A labeled box was placed in the Planning Shop for the daily collection of documentation. The collection box was emptied several times a day and the contents were filed, using the National format.

The Incident Documentation Package* prepared by Alaska IMT1 (IC-Doty) will be provided to the Alaska Fire Service at the Closeout Meeting on Friday, June 20, 2014 at 1500. Other agencies such as USFS, Military, etc. needing any documentation contained in this package have agreed to coordinate requests through Alaska Fire Service at:

Alaska Fire Service (AK9F1600)
P.O. Box 35005
Fort Wainwright, AK 99703
Attn: Fire Management Office
Phone: 907-356-5875

*The final Finance Package is managed by the Finance Unit.

Notable Successes

Having the Records Retention Kit on-site in the Plans Shop very early in the incident was great in facilitating the establishment of the documentation package from the beginning.

There were many organizations and agencies cooperating on this incident. The cooperation of these entities in sharing one set of documentation, as opposed to producing several sets, is commendable.

Significant Challenges and Resolutions

A signed copy of the Delegation of Authority was not made available to the IMT until 6/12. The original Delegation was misplaced at the Zone.

Computer Technical Specialist

Notable Successes

The ISuite database that transitioned to us was in excellent shape. The previous team did an excellent job, attributed to the fact that they had just attended an ISuite course.

Significant Challenges and Resolutions

A shortage of extension cords and power strips slowed the setup of computers. Additional power supplies should be part of the pre-order when the team gets called.

There was some difficulty in getting phone lines, fax lines, and internet, which made it extremely difficult to produce products expected from all sections. Getting an order in sooner may aid in getting



critical services in a timely manner. Attributing factors would be knowing where and when you are going to need said services.

There was some issue with ordering the correct copier to create IAPs. In the future the team should be more specific when requesting printers to produce IAP, prints booklets, number of pages printed per minute,, collate, staple, scan, etc. It may be helpful to explain why these functions are necessary.

Training

There were a total of 51 trainees on the fire working in various Sections and originating from various agencies as summarized in the table below:

		100 MILE FIRE TRAINEE COUNT					
		Command	Finance	Logistics	Operations	Plans	
ALASKAN	BLM	2	2	3		1	
RESOURCES	FS	1			13		
	AK		2	1	18		
	NWS					1	
RESOURCES	BLM				1		
FROM OUTSIDE	FS				1		
ALASKA	BIA	5					
TOTALS		8	4	4	33	2	51 Total Trainees

Logistics

Summary

The logistics section had very few challenges on this assignment. All units were staffed appropriately and no critical positions were left unfilled. The Deltana Fairgrounds was a great location for ICP, with electricity on site and plenty of room for expansion if required. The use of the caterer, Chocolate Gypsy, made the feeding of crews and overhead convenient and flexible, providing both in camp meals, packaged meals to helibase and sack lunches. Ground support was supplied an adequate number of vehicles and support was provided for additional vehicles as required for demob and backhaul of supplies. The logistics daily conference call helped to keep transportation, expanded, buying team, Agency administrator and the Type1 team all on the same page. The agency business advisor made several visits to camp and was available to solve any issues. Two SECMs were assigned night shift for security at camp and helibase. There were no reportable security issues on this incident.



Communications Unit

Notable Successes

No significant issues were encountered with Communications on this fire: the initial Type 3 communications net was modified for Type 1 Team requirements and continued to be used throughout the incident.

The double Air Link installed provided good AM coverage for both fixed wing and rotor wing flight contact and following.

No complexities with medical transports were encountered.

Significant Challenges and Resolutions

Due to the lack of adequate local high areas for repeater locations, coverage of the fire was marginal in places, but limitations were mitigated through Lookouts, Larsen antennas, and optimizing locations when line personnel encountered difficulty accessing the Command system.

Supply Unit

Notable Successes

The Type 3 organization had a good amount of supplies in place for contingencies. In addition, the initial order by the Type 1 team was received quickly. The Type 2 cache van was ordered; however, supplies in the van were not needed and the van was returned unopened. There were no critical shortages on this incident and all supplies were received in a timely manner.

During the transition period back to Type 3, additional vehicles were sent daily as needed.

Significant Challenges and Resolutions

There are no unresolved issues in the supply unit.

Medical Unit

The 100 Mile Creek Fire Medical Unit consisted of a medical unit office at the ICP staffed by 1 MEDL and 1 AEMT. Spike camps were staffed with AEMT.

ICP medical unit was staffed daily from 0730-2400 and available for urgent medical needs 24/7. There were a total of 13 non-emergencies. 104 visits to the medical unit were documented. These were taken from all medics in the field.

The Medical Unit consisted of 1 MEDL, 4 AEMF and 2 AEMT

LifeMed and Guardian flight both had a staffed medevac fixed wing in Fairbanks and could respond to Delta Jct. within 45 minutes to 1 hour.

Notable Successes

- 2 new line EMTs were assigned for training opportunities.
- Contacts established and Inspection of a new local clinic in Delta Jct.



Significant Challenges and Resolutions

Communication flow from the team to AFS and from AFS to the team regarding patient status was problematic at times. The team is working with AFS for communication flow within the team and between the team and Agency dispatch for future assignments. There are no unresolved issues at this time.

Facilities Unit

Notable Successes

ICP was established at the fairgrounds in Delta Junction. The fairgrounds were an excellent location for ICP as there were several buildings available for use and a large area of land. The biggest success was that the camp was operational by the end of the first shift due to having electricity, tables and chairs in many of the Fairground buildings. Additionally, two FACs arrived on the incident Tuesday afternoon and were able to commence ICP set up immediately. The team did not have to wait for many of the essential supplies to arrive as the Type 3 team already had most in stock and those supplies that were ordered arrived in a timely manner.

Significant Challenges and Resolutions

There are no unresolved issues

Food Unit

Notable Successes

- Ordering, coordination and distribution of Fresh Food boxes went extremely well due to the coordination among the Helibase, Supply and Food unit personnel.
- The ice and water procurement from the local store was convenient and was adequate for the needs.
- The caterer provided meals and sack lunches on site, allowing for last minute changes and the ability to accommodate crews mobilizing and demobilizing.

Significant Challenges and Resolutions

- The MFSU contract was not readily available at the start of food service. This made it difficult for the FDUL to determine what the contract requirements were.

Resolution-Prepare a pre-season blanket contract and post on the AICC web page.

- The MFSU contract differs between the State and AFS as well as from the National contract. This makes it difficult for the FDUL to determine performance measures required of the caterer and makes it difficult for the caterer to know what is expected of them.



Resolution-Both Agency's contracts should be similar in wording and suggest using the National contract as a guide. Several suggestions were made to the contracting officer and amendments were made to the contract.

- The catering company neglected to test their potable water.

Resolution-Water was tested by the FDUL. However, this needs to be done prior to the startup of operations in the future.

Ground Support Unit

Notable Successes

Ground Support at 100 Mile Creek Fire had a very good working relationship with AFS transportation section. AFS transportation was eager to assist with all incident transportation requests. Demobilization of the crews was coordinated between the two transportation units and was a well-orchestrated timely demob. AFS ground support had all the vehicles the team required upon mobilization. This enabled the team to depart for the incident from AFS in an orderly and timely fashion. No additional vehicle requests were required as the 25 vehicles were sufficient for the team's needs.

Significant Challenges and Resolutions

The team is working on additional check-in requirements for personnel who arrive with vehicles. The ROSS records often times have vehicles listed that are not assigned to the team. This makes tracking of vehicles that are the team's responsibility challenging.

Finance

Summary

The Finance Section managed the 100 Mile Creek Fire and all of its resources within one functional database. All known resources were accurately tracked and their cost information reported daily to the Incident Agency.

Interaction with the local unit was facilitated by the presence of the Incident Business Advisor who was assigned at the same time the Alaska IMT arrived.

The AFS Finance Section provided a thorough inbriefing and provided appropriate documentation. Land Use Agreements were already in place for the Team to use. The LUAs included:

- Deltana Fairgrounds – Used as ICP for T1 team. LUA completed AFS Finance.
- Shaw Creek Boat Owner's Association Launch – staging of AFS vehicle and boat trailer
- Bill Allen – Smokejumper Staging and helipad on Clearwater Creek
- Lion's Den – Logistics and Operations Work Station



These four LUAs will be closed when the Team demobilizes. The Type 3 organization will be moved to the Arkansas Helibase. There was no damage to any of the properties.

A quality Finance package was given to the Team Finance from the Type 3 organization. I-Suite was being used on the Type 3 incident, and personnel transitioned to the Type 1 organization.

A BUYT was located in Fairbanks, and all purchases and agreements were made by the BUYT. BUYT costs were provided daily for inclusion in the daily COST summary.

The Military provided UAV services for the incident, operating on night shift until June 13, 2014, and then transitioning to day shift. Military personnel camped at ICP to staff the unit. Meals were provided, but the personnel charged their time to their military unit.

There were a total of six Injury/Illness Claims. There is one potential claim, i.e., Deltana Fairgrounds. Documentation is in the files. The majority of the Injury / Illness cases were transported to Fairbanks for treatment, at the request of the MEDL. Injury / Illness log is in the Finance package.

The total cost of the incident as of June 19, 2014 is \$8,069,080.

Time Unit

Notable Successes

The I-Suite database was current when the Team accepted command of the Incident. At the height of the incident there were 23 T1, T2IA and T2 crews assigned to the fire, smokejumpers staged at Clearwater Staging area, and miscellaneous personnel. The crews were spiked out, so time was delivered to camp from staging. Incident personnel were diligent in staying current on their time.

Cost Unit

Notable Successes

Cost was kept current and reports were prepared for IBA. The supply cost per person was adjusted, based on documentation provided by AFS Cache. The significant cost for supply was fresh food boxes for all of the crews spiked out on the fire.

Procurement Unit

Notable Successes


There were very few contracted resources. Besides the LUAs, there were rental cars, a potable water truck, gray water truck, and logistical support resources, i.e., porta-potties, dumpsters, handwashing units.

Significant Challenges and Resolutions


There was some question as to who was paying the invoices, whether it was the BUYT or one of two individuals at ASF. IBA provided answers so proper paperwork could be provided with payment packages.




Appendix A: Operations Map



Appendix B: Progression Map



Appendix C: Ownership Map



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ALASKA
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
T E A M