

# Oregon Lakes Fire

AK-MID-000077



May 7 – 20, 2019



**ALASKA**  
**INCIDENT MANAGEMENT**  
**TEAM**

**Incident Commander Norm McDonald**

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**Contents**

- Key Decisions ..... 1
- Incident Objectives ..... 2
- Incident Overview ..... 3
- Fire Weather ..... 4
- Fire Behavior ..... 5
- Command..... 5
  - Incident Commander ..... 6
  - Safety ..... 7
  - Liaison ..... 8
  - Information ..... 8
- Operations ..... 10
- Air Operations..... 12
- Planning ..... 13
  - Summary ..... 13
  - Situation Unit ..... 13
  - Resources Unit ..... 15
  - Demobilization Unit ..... 15
  - Documentation Unit ..... 16
  - Computer Technical Specialist ..... 16
  - Training ..... 16
- Logistics..... 17
  - Summary ..... 17
  - Communications Unit ..... 17
  - Supply Unit..... 18
  - Medical Unit..... 19
  - Facilities Unit..... 19
  - Food Unit..... 20
  - Ground Support Unit..... 20
- Finance ..... 20
  - Summary ..... 20

Time Unit..... 20  
Cost Unit..... 21  
Procurement Unit ..... 21  
Appendix A: Operations Map..... 24  
Appendix B: Progression Map..... 41  
Appendix C: Ownership Map ..... 42



## Key Decisions

- Roster a short team – The Incident Management Team coordinated with BLM Alaska Fire Service Military Zone Fire Management Officer prior to order to determine scope of mission. The FMO provided team with tasking paper outlining intent. With this in mind, the IMT was able to tailor roster to meet the needs of the assignment. Although the roster modification was right for the tasking, modifying the standard short team roster took creative ROSS work.
- Develop a strategic plan – The initial task was to develop a long-term strategic plan and assist the Military Zone in implementing a course of action appropriate for the incident, given the time of year. Having several days to plan an operational approach, gave the team time to organize the limited resources to accomplish the objectives of the incident.
- Order of second Type 2 IMT, not a local Type 3 organization – The complexity analysis completed by the Alaska IMT and validated by the Agency Administrators identified a Type 2 organization was needed to manage incident. Complexity of incident was driven by military involvement, hazards, and fire history of the region.
- Initiated burning operations instead of monitoring – One of the decisions to come out of the strategic planning meeting was to proceed with burning as soon as conditions allowed. The monitoring alternative was discussed but not chosen. This justification was time of year, availability of resources and high probability of success using previously established fuels breaks.
- Allowing per diem for resources assigned – Although minor in the long run, the decision to allow per diem vs catering or fresh food was significant that allowed the team to focus on the planning mission and not logistical support requirements. The cost comparisons validated this decision. The only cheaper alternative was MREs, would have resulted in low morale.
- Assigning an Agency Representative was critical to team success – The complexity of operating on a military installation engaging in training activities, including small arms, mortar, artillery and international aviation missions, would have overwhelmed the team. The agency representative eliminated the need for a Liaison Officer, which allowed the free position to go to a support function.
- Hosting three strategic planning sessions – The result was improved common operating picture, and a shared risk and decision making, which in turn resulted in clear direction to the firefighters operating in the field. Often, direction is given early in the incident, however, as conditions



The Oregon Lakes Fire ignited on April 30, 2019 and burning in a military impact area miles southwest of Delta Junction. Photo from May 1, 2019. Photo by Collins Bonds, BLM AFS.

change, it is the team that chooses the direction the operation undertakes. The IMT feels the planning sessions provided clear direction and tasking.

- Discovery of potential UXO on May 19 led to discussion re-visiting exposure and risk tolerance of firefighters and IMT. Decision was made to disengage and re-assess strategies and tactic along Primary containment lines. This will lead to lower probability of success in holding Primary containment line.

## Incident Objectives

Throughout most of the IMT's tenure on the fire, the incident objectives were to:

### **Provide for firefighter and public safety through sound risk management, implementation of mitigations and clear understanding of assignments and associated hazards.**

- As part of the in briefing, unidentified ordinances (UXO) were identified as an obvious hazard. Mitigation efforts included close coordination of all efforts with Range Control and Agency Representatives.
  - The Alaska IMT did not deploy firefighters into the field without a UXO briefing.
  - Range control officers were assigned to work with heavy equipment, identifying potential UXO and reducing risk of exposure.
  - Where possible, operations were conducted off of previously established control lines identified as lowest risk.
  - Prior to engaging in suppression actions, the emergency medical response process was tested via medical incident simulation.
- 2. Assess, monitor and implement suppression operations to protect known values including private property, military infrastructure and timber values.**
    - The Alaska IMT identified and validated values identified by agency administrators.
    - Firing operation was completed to reduce risk of fire crossing the shear-blade line, keeping the fire away from values.
    - Monitoring option was established to provide an early detection of threat that will require future action.
    - Private cabins were recorded into Collector Application to update known sites database and capture a protection plan for this, and future incidents.
  - 3. Enhance community, cooperator and stake holder relationships through timely exchange of accurate information.**
    - Daily agency administrator calls were established to provide current fire information and develop a common operating picture.



The BLM Alaska Fire Service Chena Interagency Hotshot Crew unload their gear from the van after arriving at the Oregon Lakes Fire camp on May 12, 2019. Photo by Beth Ipsen, Alaska Interagency Incident Management Team



- Provided public meeting to the community of Delta Junction prior to implementing firing operations. Open communication resulted into very little interest when operations produced large columns of smoke which were visible from the community.
  - Worked with agency representative to enhance communications with Range Control. Daily operational updates were communicated and disseminated to garrison staff.
- 4. Deliver long term strategic plan considering values at risk, exposure and probability of success. Provide strategic planning analysis, decision support and long-term fire analysis to agencies to aid in determining appropriate strategies.**
    - The IMT presented three strategic planning meetings throughout the incident.
    - Management action points were developed to include in WFDSS.
    - IMT reached out to State Division of Homeland Security to develop evacuation protocols. Emergency plan and contacts were included for future planning.
  - 5. Ensure cost containment measures are identified, applied and documented. Integrate cost accountability into every decision.**
    - Team Command and General Staff documented cost savings measures for each section.

## Incident Overview

- 1. Acres:** estimated at 15,174 acres as of May 21. All estimates are done via a recon flight and satellite imagery.
- 2. People assigned:** 166 as of May 20, 209 including five crews. Gannett Glacier Type 2 Initial Attack is on hold at the ICP and the White Mountain T2IA Crew demobilizes on May 20. Both are Division of Forestry Crews.
- 3. Situation:**
  - The Oregon Lakes Fire (#077) was reported by U.S. Army Garrison Range Control on April 30th at approximately about 1 p.m.
  - Until Wednesday, May 15th, the fire had been burning in an area that is off-limits to firefighters and low-flying fire suppression aircraft due to the likelihood of unexploded ordinance on the ground.
  - It was predominately burning mostly in tall, dry grass and downed trees from the 2013 Mississippi Fire on the west of Delta River.
  - The cause of the fire was investigated by a BLM AFS fire investigator (Mike Bradley) and a trainee from the BLM Fairbanks Field Office (Special Agent Seth McMillian). The report has not been finalized and it considered an open investigation. The investigation is ongoing.
  - The fire is burning roughly 11 miles south of Delta Junction. Smoke was very visible on a couple of days.
  - Due to the predicted weather, the fire is expected to continue to grow to the north. The community of Whitestone, which was threatened by the Mississippi Fire, is roughly



14 miles to the north and a state timber area is about 7 miles to the northeast. Both are on the same side of the Delta River as the fire.

- The fire spotted to the north of the fuel break on May 12, creating a roughly 250-acre slopover. Firefighters contained and mopped up this spot.
- During a burn operation to extend the firebreak past Douglas Creek on May 15, thundercells moved into the fire area and pushed the fire out of the impact area and merged with the burnout. The fire doubled in size, but was kept south of the primary control line.
- On May 18, an unidentifiable object (UXO) was found approximately 20 feet south of the shear blade line in division. Firefighters were pulled from the area and an EOD team responded from JBER to assess the threat. It was deemed inert.
- On May 20, another UXO was discovered while a crew was mopping up the slopover from May 12. The Forestry personnel assigned to the fire as an UXO technician cleared the object



A smoke column rises Wednesday morning, May 15, 2019, from the Oregon Lakes Fire where firefighters conducted a burnout operation the evening before. The smoke is indicating that the burnable vegetation is being removed along the firebreak under construction.

## Fire Weather

### *Summary*

Overall, the weather experienced while the IMT was in command of this fire was typical of late-spring/early-summer conditions in Interior Alaska. Cool to warm days with cold nights were typical. The typical geographically-caused southerly gap winds indicative of Delta Junction were present on numerous occasions. Red Flag conditions were experienced in the fire area on several occasions which had a little effect on fire behavior and growth. These Red Flag days had minimal growth.

The IMT took command of the fire on May 7, the first day in which Red Flag Warnings were in effect for the fire area for wind and low RH. Even with strong, gusty, southerly gap winds the entire day, the fire experienced virtually no fire growth and only a few interior smokes were observed.

After a couple days of moderating weather on May 8-9, the fire experienced Red Flag conditions again on May 10, for gusty gap winds and low RH. The fire area recorded south winds reaching 25-35 mph with gusts of over 50 mph. Again, in spite of this, the fire experienced almost no growth during this event.

A general warming and drying trend, which began on May 10, with temperatures in the mid-60 and RH values in the mid-teens, continued for several days. Predicted conditions were favorable for firing operations on May 12. However, brief gusty south winds were present during these operations, which caused the major sloopover on the first day of firing.

As this warming and drying trend continued, there was a noticeable gradual increase in fire behavior along many parts of the fire perimeter. Eventually fire activity was observed in vicinity of the northwest corner of the fire on May 14 that had not shown any smoke or activity for nearly two weeks.

On May 15, the fire more than doubled in size, primarily driven by high winds after several days of consecutive warming and drying. This day started like several of the previous days. Key differences were renewed fire activity on the northwest corner of the fire, combined with gusty outflow winds from a passing rain cell in the late afternoon. These factors caused a major fire run on the northwest flank in predominately fine fuels.

The weather during the days following this wind-driven fire event were somewhat milder, but still relatively warm and dry until May 17. Isolated rain showers were experienced in the fire area and May 18 when widespread rain occurred over the entire fire area. Fire activity was minimal after this moisture event.

May 19 marked another transition back to a gradual warming and drying trend which extended past the transfer of command with the new IMT2 on May 21..

## Fire Behavior

### *Summary*

The fire was burning primarily in the Mississippi Fire (2013) and Carla Fire (1998) burn scars. The fire grew to approximately 3,500 acres and was being monitored since the fire was located in the firing range impact area which contains unexploded ordinances (UXO) and is closed for any suppression activity. The weather values at that time were 58 degrees, 15% Relative Humidity, winds from the northeast 8 mph with gusts up to 15 mph. With the two previous fires, the fuels changed in the burn area to more of a grass fuel model O-1b (Standing Grass). Local fire management staff indicated the snow cover melted earlier than normal and prescribe burning in the area was conducted a month early. Grass green-up had not started, and the cure input for grass was approximately 90 percent and available to burn. Some fire has pushed into the hardwoods and spruce timber edges, but it is still early for these



fuel models to be highly reactive there are indications conditions are changing. The current dead and down under the tree canopy is readily burning.

Lower temperatures and higher relative humidity's helped with the containment efforts. This fire will need to be monitored until the season ending moistures come as this fire area has a history of fires remaining inactive or dormant until much drier and windier condition return later in the fire season.

A new incident management team was ordered to continue to harden and secure the burnout and to re-evaluate and validate the strategies or to see if other strategies are needed secure the fire to its current size.

## Command

### Incident Commander

#### *Mobilization*

Incident objectives were established to protect values, both immediate and long term. Values identified by the agency administrators included private structures, military infrastructure, natural resources (timber), and community relationships. Because of recent fire history, public information and relationship building was an emphasis for the IMT. Time of season was a concern due to potential of a long duration incident. Strategic planning and identifying management action points were included in the delegation to assist the Military Zone to re-engage if needed. Management action points included environmental conditions as well as geographic lines that were identified, documented and presented.



On May 9, Operations Section Chief in training, Casey Boespflug, with pointer, briefs a group of representatives from the Bureau of Land Management, State of Alaska, Department of Defense and the Alaska Wildland Fire Coordinating Group, about a long-term strategy on how to manage the Oregon Lakes Fire.

#### **Delegation of Authority and Transfer of Command:**

The U.S. Army Garrison Alaska, the BLM Alaska Eastern Interior Field Office, and BLM Alaska Fire Service Military Fire Management Zone issued a Delegation of Authority for management of the Oregon Lakes Fire to Incident Commander Norm McDonald. The delegation provided the IMT with clear direction and the IMT transferred command with the Type 4 IC (Collins Bonds) at 0700 on May 7. The main focus was to protect values at risk on State of Alaska and private lands north of the fire, including residential areas in the Richardson Clearwater, South Bank, Clear Creek, and Whitestone communities; three communication towers within the northeastern portion of the Planning Area; recreational cabins;



anadromous fish habitat; and timber stands. Military assets, including Observation Points, impacts to military training exercises, and additional impact areas west to Delta Creek and south of the current fire perimeter were also at risk. The Delegation transferred responsibility for adhering to the objectives, requirements, and courses of action as established in the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) Decision.

### **WFDSS**

The initial WFDSS and revised WFDSS were *not* adequate to determine the concerns and requirements of published signers. The WFDSS lacked clear objectives and values.



**White Mountain Type 2 Initial Attack firefighters use beaters to cool the edges of the burnout on May 14, 2019. Photo by Evan Sterling, Fire Medic**

On May 5, a meeting was held to adjust the WFDSS decision, including updating objectives and values at risk, completed May 6. An updated decision was published May 12 to include the strategic assessment for the incident, and again May 18, increasing the estimated cost to \$3.5M and included an updated risk analysis.

### **Area Fuels Mitigation Recommendation**

The fire area was located entirely in military land within AFS protection area.

### **Known Sites**

Known sites collection for the Planning Area was outlined in the original delegation. The area of interest included values on State and private lands including the Richardson Clearwater, South Bank, Whitestone, and permitted cabins. Most of these assets had been previously identified during the 2013 Mississippi Fire and 2014 100 Mile Creek Fire.

### **Human Resources:**

There was no Human Resource Specialist assigned to the incident. There were no reported HR issues.

## **Safety**

### **Summary**

There was one Team Safety Officer (SOF2) initially assigned to the incident. One Line Safety Officer (SOFR) and one Trainee (SOFRT) were added as complexities and numbers of personnel grew. SOFRs were spiked out with other line personnel. An unidentified item, suspicious of being UXO, was found in Division A on May 18. The SOFR secured the site and captured photographs to pass onto Range Control. For added safety, it was decided to keep all personnel on the winter trail throughout all three divisions. There was a bear sighting without incident and several moose also frequented the fire area.



### *Notable Successes*

An incident exercise simulating a Red Level Emergency Medical Scenario was performed with overall positive results. Successes and minor imperfections were noted in an After Action Report.

### *Significant Challenges and Resolutions*

A significant safety concern for the Team was unexploded ordinance (UXO) in and outside of the military impact zone. Safety briefings were provided by Range Control for all personnel entering the fire area. Range Control Personnel were provided to work with personnel and equipment. A local retired Range Control Officer, who is now a Division of Forestry Delta Area Forestry employee, was assigned to help identify hazards.

Initial radio communications were also a concern due to multiple points of communication that were pre-established for the multi-agency jurisdictional boundaries the fire area. Adding an Incident Communications Unit streamlined and cleaned up the process.

GPS interference testing was implemented for most of the State of Alaska by the Joint Frequency Management Office on May 9 extending to May 31. This created navigational safety concerns for Incident aircraft and personnel working near the various Military Operational Areas (MOAs). A safety plan was developed to address and mitigate concerns related to GPS jamming in the MOAs.

### **Liaison**

There was no Liaison Officer assigned to the incident.

### *Significant Challenges and Resolutions*

The cause of the fire is under investigation.

### **Information**

#### *Summary*

The fire originated in the BLM AFS Military Zone (MID), wholly within the Oregon Lakes Impact Area. The fire's location is in a place that is unsafe for firefighters and low-flying fire suppression aircraft due to the likelihood of unexploded ordinance (UXO) on the ground. The fire was burning mostly in downed trees from the 2013 Mississippi Fire and tall, dry grass on the west side of the Delta River.

The Delta Junction community and surrounding area is accustomed to fire activity, especially in the MID where prescribed burns and large project fires have been reoccurring for several years. Because of this sensitivity, a short Type 2 Alaska Interagency Incident Management Team, with a strong information section, was ordered. Two PIO2s traveled to Delta with the team while the BLM AFS Public Affairs Specialist (PAS), a PIO2t, remained at AFS providing support with internet connectivity. Once the ICP was up and functioning, the PIO2t relocated to ICP to further their training.

The Alaska Division of Forestry Delta Area office posted information, supplied by the BLM PAS, in key places around the Delta community. Once the team took command of the fire, the two PIO2s took possession of the trapline. Time was spent at the IGA Food Cache information board during the busy



shopping time as area residents were stopping at the grocery store between work and traveling home for the evening. The trapline consisted of six locations; the aforementioned grocery store, two local gas stations, the U.S. Post Office, the local public library and one local business. The one local business was chosen because it is owned and operated by residents of the remote community of Whitestone that would be in the path of a rapidly advancing, wind-driven fire. A much larger trapline could have been rapidly expanded should there have been a need.

Existing social media sites were used to distribute information:

AKFireInfo.com

[www.facebook.com/BLMAFS](http://www.facebook.com/BLMAFS)

[twitter.com/BLM\\_AFS](https://twitter.com/BLM_AFS)

An InciWeb site was created, <https://inciweb.nwcg.gov/incident/6308/>

The BLM AFS PAS's agency email was used for the distribution of releases and other information. This was done because the fire's suppression is the responsibility of BLM AFS and was already being used before the IMT was mobilized. A firenet account was established with email [2019\\_AKMID\\_OregonLakes@firenet.gov](mailto:2019_AKMID_OregonLakes@firenet.gov), (password: Alask@Fire2019!). A Google Voice system was created linking PIO phones to a (208)254-1130 phone number.

Once the strategic plan was approved, agency administrators and fire managers requested a community meeting to be held before burn operations that were planned for Sunday. The meeting was held Saturday, May 11 at Delta Junction City Hall. Seven community members and a reporter from the local weekly newspaper, The Delta Wind, attended the meeting. The meeting was broadcast live on BLM AFS's Facebook page. There were nine viewers, but the post has reached many more following the meeting.

There has been light interest from media statewide, with more interest from the local newspaper, the Delta Wind.

1. Delta Wind editor/publisher Mike Paschall ([editor@deltawindonline.com](mailto:editor@deltawindonline.com) or cell 460-8629) is covering the fire remotely from North Carolina, but routinely updates the website at <https://www.deltawindonline.com/>.
2. Radio stations in Delta Junction – The two local radio stations are not staffed on the weekend. Both may be hard to reach even during normal business hours.
  - KBAY is broadcasted out of Homer with a translator station in Delta Junction ([kwavefm@xyz.net](mailto:kwavefm@xyz.net)). 235-6000 or 262-6000
  - KDHS Delta High School Radio [kdhs@dgsd.us](mailto:kdhs@dgsd.us) 907-895-4460/895-5329/206-395-8443
  - KUAC is the interior NPR affiliate with a translator in Delta Junction. Contacts are Dan Bross ([dan.kuac@alaska.edu](mailto:dan.kuac@alaska.edu), 474-5085 or cell 460-4658) and Tim Ellis ([tim.kuac@alaska.edu](mailto:tim.kuac@alaska.edu), 474-5056).

### *Notable Successes*

- Provided a training opportunity for the PIO2t



- Developing and presenting the strategic plan to agency administrators.
- Distributing and posting accurate information in a timely manner to the public, media, cooperators and agency administrators.
- Hosting a community meeting with a only a 30 hours notice.

### *Significant Challenges and Resolutions*

- Having a small staff that was dividing its time between standard fire information duties and the strategic planning process made update distribution and posting to social media difficult to do in a timely manner.
- Hosting a community meeting with only 30 hours notice.
- Using FireNet was too difficult to figure out on the incident. Work will need to be done before the next fire assignment to be able to utilize this mandated system.
- Audio levels were low on the Facebook Live broadcast of the community meeting. After the meeting the video was edited to increase the volume. Re-posting it to Facebook proved to be problematic because it took almost the entire next day to upload using the internet available at ICP.
- Providing more detail on supply order requests to insure they were filled in a timely manner. For example, the request to pay for the meeting space did not move through the system smoothly.



Firefighters from the Type 2 Emergency Firefighter Fairbanks #1 crew get their gear ready to eventually shuttle to the fireline on May 17, 2019. Pictured are, from left to right, Christopher Wright, Mandy Cadzow, Khrystian Simon, Glen Duncan with Blaine Amory and Jayton Titus in back. Photo by Beth Ipsen, Alaska Interagency Incident Management Team

## Operations

### *Summary*

Initiate long-term strategic plan analyzing risk, cost, duration and success options for agency administrators. The Alaska Incident Management Team identified and implemented options for protecting values at risk identified in the delegation of authority and WFDSS. This assessment was helpful for developing several options to meet objectives for the agencies. Operations developed



Firefighters, aided by aircraft and equipment, secured the northwest corner of the fire on May 17, 2019. Photo by Karen Scholl, Alaska Interagency Incident Management Team

management action points, alternative lines and point protections alternatives listed on the strategic analysis spreadsheet.

#### **Primary Strategy:**

An indirect line was established on the shear-blade line and winter road from the Delta River to Delta Creek. The shear-blade section starts at the Delta River and ties into the Mississippi Fire burn scar. Due to time of year, pre-green up vegetation, fire history, and fuel modeling, the decision was made to burn the grass south of the shear blade/winter trail containment line in the old Mississippi Fire Scar to halt fire spread to the north. This strategy halted the fire spread progression northward and secured

the values at risk including remote timber resources, community of Whitestone, South Bank, Richardson-Clearwater Creek Area. The Delta River is a natural barrier for Fort Greely, Delta Junction, and Big Delta.

#### **Secondary Strategy:**

An indirect line was constructed from Whitestone Community west to Delta Creek with dozers during the 2007 Carla Lake Fire. During the 2013 Mississippi Fire, a burnout around the community of Whitestone was successful and is currently a viable fire break. This strategy halts the fire's progression northward and secures the values at risk to the north of the fire, including the Richardson-Clearwater Creek, South Bank, and Whitestone subdivisions. The secondary strategy would be to utilize and improve the 2007 Carla Lake Fire dozerline to control fire spread to the north. Structure protection and assessments would be conducted using the previous fires structure protection assessments.

#### **Point Protection Strategy:**

Provide point protection for the structures along Richardson-Clearwater Creek area, South Bank, Whitestone Farm community, and the surrounding area. The Tenderfoot subdivision, Shaw Creek, Quartz Lake, Big Delta, Delta Junction, and Fort Greeley were identified and assessed for structure protection needs; no equipment was deployed. Management Action Points were identified and established in WFDSS with criteria and recommended actions to take if these criteria are met. The Military Assets Observation Points (OP) west of the fire has structure protection. Evaluation points are identified between the fire and the values.

The timber stands north and east of the fire were not immediately threatened. If the fire begins to move in the direction of the timber stands, aviation assets would be deployed to limit its spread initially. This strategy has a high probability of success and allocated suppression efforts commensurate with the

values at risk, given the fire behavior, weather, and resource available at the time. However, uncertainty about the timing of a fire-ending event, and the likelihood that another chinook event could push the fire across the shear blade control line and threaten the above-mentioned communities and the Richardson Highway, led the IMT to consider action on the primary line.

## Air Operations

### Summary

Due to the complexity of airspace encapsulating the fire and the obvious safety implications of fire suppression in an active joint Army and Air Force munitions impact training area, attention to air and ground deconfliction was the priority.

Developing a good rapport with both the Military Range Control and Donnelly Training Area (DTA) staff was critical in safely conducting aviation activities. It was imperative that introductions and two-way communications was established early. Verification of deconfliction parameters was also essential because both range control operations, while using a shared data base, had multiple dispatchers, resulting in sporadic information sharing seemed. When in doubt, verification proved to be critical in maintaining safe aviation operations. Assuming anything within the fire area and adjoining airspace is a bad idea.

Allocation of required airspace, per ASGS requests, were never denied by range control. When ordering off-base aerial resources, the team placed a call directly to the flight manager for a mission specific airspace briefing. Ensuring statewide tactical resources had fire information and map links was a main priority due to the changing nature of the airspace and Northern Edge military exercises. DTA management advised that if the fire were to blow up, and a heavy tactical air presence was required, it would be safest to order a Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) over the restricted area.

The team went to great lengths to save money on aircraft costs and borrowed AFS airplanes along with an Alaska Division of Forestry helicopter to help facilitate operational needs. The Agency Representative and Military Zone Aviation Manager were both instrumental to the safety and success of the team's aviation operations during mobilization and throughout the assignment. A TFR was put into place on May 10 in consultation with DTA range control. This has mitigated any potential problems associated with Northern Edge Activities.



A Bell helicopter pilot using a long line delivers a UTV to firefighters working just north of the impact area on the Oregon Lakes Fire. Photo by Kale Casey, Alaska Interagency Incident Team



## Planning

### Summary

The rostered planning section for the short IMT included 1 PSC2, 1 SITL, 1 RESL, 1 GISS, and 1 GISS (t). An FBAN was resource ordered and arrived shortly after the main team. The IMT also used an off-site LTAN, who was already on a GACC support order, for long term strategic planning.

The incident operational period ran from 0700-2300, with a 0800 Operational Briefing. Briefings were delivered to field personnel via radio from Incident Command Post (ICP). Incident Action Plans (IAP) were delivered both in paper and electronically via QR code. The daily planning cycle was as follows:



**Plans Section Chief Adam Kohley broadcasts the morning operational briefing to people at the Incident Command Post and in the field on May 14, 2019.**

0730	Pre-ops briefing
0800	Operational Briefing
0900	Projections
0945	Alaska Weather
1030	IC/AA Call
1200	C&G
1630	Tactics
1700	Planning
2000	C&G

### Situation Unit

The Situation Unit assumed responsibility for the ICS 209s, fire weather spot forecasts, and incident map products on May 7. The Unit was initially comprised of a SITL, GISS, 2x GISS(T), and

FBAN. There were several GISS personnel changes and a FOBS joined the team on May 17.

The development and ongoing improvement of GIS products can be attributed in part to the GIS assistance from AFS which included data layers and pre-built projects such as the Alaska Known Site Database. Additionally, AK IMT records from the Mississippi fire in 2013 and the 100 Mile Fire in 2014 provided good data for the fire to obtain intelligence. Information in the Alaska Known Site Database regarding sites within the fire area south of the Delta River Alaska Known Site Database was updated by the FOBS.

AFS Military Zone personnel and Resource Advisor Dan Reece were valuable contacts regarding questions pertaining to locations within the Military Zone and were able to quickly answer questions regarding specific locations of interest in the fire area.



The BLM Alaska Fire Service GIS Section in Fort Wainwright provided the original fire perimeter. The fire perimeter was updated twice during the incident using aerial mapping by helicopter.

Status as of May 20:

Fire Number	Fire Name	Acres
AK-MID-000077	Oregon Lake	15,173



Firefighters work on a new start northwest of the Oregon Lakes Fire on May 20, 2019. Photo by Karen Scholl, Alaska Interagency Incident Management Team

### *Notable Successes*

Support from the Delta Area Forestry Office was outstanding. Without their support, the ICS-209s would not have been completed online the first full day the IMT was in command of the incident. Also, the GISS section would not have been able to begin work on map products while internet service was unavailable at ICP and the plotters at ICP were not functioning. Their office was used every day for large copy machine print jobs (items such as the IAP, smaller maps, etc). As a result of this support, the IMT did not have to order a large printer/copy machine which reduced incident costs.

Access to the AK Known Site Database combined with the incident data from 100 Mile and Mississippi Fires allowed for the IMT to quickly obtain situational awareness of the values at risk in the area and allowed for the rapid production of map products by the GISS.

### *Significant Challenges and Resolutions*

Obtaining internet service at the ICP took some time, which hindered the ability of the Situation Unit from fully functioning at the ICP for about 24 hours. This issue was mitigated by the Plans Section staying behind at Fort Wainwright for an additional night and working from that location rather than immediately traveling to Delta Junction. After arrival in Delta Junction, the SITL and GISS were able to begin work that required an internet connection at the Delta Area Forestry Office until the internet connection was established.

The GISS had challenges with the plotters that from the AFS Cache. The initial one ordered for the fire did not have a functioning print head so a second plotter was ordered from the Cache since that was faster than obtaining a new print head. Neither plotters came with adequate ink. GISS initially printed map products at Delta Area Forestry while waiting for the second AFS Cache plotter to arrive at ICP. Between the consumable supplies that were included with the two plotters ordered, GISS was able to get one plotter functioning. Replacement supplies were immediately ordered for both plotters to use on the incident and to properly refurbish them prior to return to the AFS Cache.





The Division of Forestry's Pioneer Peak Interagency Hotshot Crew waits for another shuttle out to the fireline on May 15, 2019. Photo by Beth Ipsen, Alaska Interagency Incident Management Team

Prior to returning the plotters back to the AFS Cache, each of them were refurbished with adequate ink, paper, and a new print head each so that these issues will not occur the next time the plotters are ordered for an incident. Additionally, the GISS section created a checklist for refurbishing the plotter the next time it is used on an incident and included that checklist inside the plotter box.

### *Unresolved Issues*

There is a discrepancy between the GIS layer for the military impact areas

and where the impact actually exists. On the ground, the entire north perimeter of the military impact area has a masticated line. The GIS layer for this line does not follow the masticated line on the maps nor when locating the boundary on the ground. The GIS layer needs to be updated to ensure that it reflects the actual boundary.

### **Resources Unit**

The Resources Unit was staffed with one RESL. Using the e-iSuite database, the team checked-in and entered data for over 180 personnel, provided daily IAPs, and resource tracking reports.

### *Notable Successes*

Due to the nature of the assignment, the incident was initially supported with a one-page IAP (Epp version). This document contains all basic information including incident objectives, resources, assignments, communication frequencies, IMT contact lists, and aviation information. Due to the lack of field-going personnel, the one-page format provided all necessary information. It is also cost effective – requiring a simple printer using little paper. Once the incident expanded on May 13 and field operations were established, the IMT switched to an e-iSuite standard IAP for the duration of their tour.

Delta Area Forestry provided copy services for the incident action plans.

### *Significant Challenges and Resolutions*

The original copy machine order was not specific enough and was filled with a copier that was inadequate for IAP production. Plans and Logistics worked with the Buying Team to replace the copier, and added the necessary specificity to the IMT initial order to avoid similar problems in the future.

### **Demobilization Unit**

There was no DMOB with the Alaska Type 2 IMT. DMOB duties were handled by RESL.



## Documentation Unit

There was no DOCL with the Alaska Type 2 IMT. DOCL duties were handled by RESL.

## Computer Technical Specialist

18 AFS Fire Laptops and three GIS laptops were brought to the fire. Two of the new wireless printers were deployed and mapped with the new Synology routers with success. All of the routers were configured as APs, so time was spent the first night wiping and reconfiguring one of the APs to act as an actual router.

Before travel to the fairgrounds it was relayed that there was already internet in place. Upon arrival, it was quickly determined to not be the case. It took over 24 hours to establish ACS as not being an option due to their refusal to turn on data for anything less than a 2-year contract. Primary cellular coverage was ATT (LTE) with both Verizon and GCI receiving 3G.

“Ax-S-Anywhere” was brought in as an alternate solution (line of sight internet service). Hardline was hooked up and the guest wifi two days after (for general use and not highly used during the incident). “Ax-S-Anywhere” was available, receptive and easy to work with for establishing and troubleshooting service.

Only one wireless router was needed to cover the heavy network use buildings (hard line from dish to our router, then a direct line to both the server and GIS - everything else was wireless), the Logistics/Med/Commo building was able to use the wireless off of the service pole but did not (and were okay with not) having access to the I and R drives. When access was needed, they accessed in another building. Guest wireless appears to reach the Lions building.

e-iSuite Site was utilized for this incident due to initial connectivity concerns – internal network worked great and got us up and running while dealing with the late start to internet connectivity.

A high-capacity and multi-feature copier/printer was added to the hardline 5/17.

Symantec caused a lockdown on the server after a week of being fully functional. Making a firewall exception for port 59123 solved this – unsure why the server laptop didn’t have this while it was being configured.

No real issues with latency or the network.

Rapid Comm trailer was ordered on 5/18 from DOF to help support the communication and internet needs for the rapidly expanding Arkansas Helibase.



From left to right, Safety Officer Tom Geiling, Operations Section Chief trainee Casey Boespflug and Operations Section Chief Karen Scholl use cell phones to hold a pre-operations morning briefing with Division Operations Supervisors in the field on May 19, 2019. Photo by Kale Casey, Alaska Interagency Incident Management Team



## Training

There were a total of 17 trainees on the fire. Three completed their position taskbooks.

Command	2
Plans	3
Logistics	4
Finance	3
Operations	5



The White Mountain Type 2 Initial Attack crew camped in the field the overnight on May 12, 2019 in order to get an early start on the slopover. Photo by Evan Sterling, Fire Medic

## Logistics

### Summary

#### *Notable Successes*

The logistics section had very few challenges on this assignment. All units were staffed appropriately. We were able to bring three trainees into the Logistic section. Because of the size of the incident no Ground Support, COML or Food unit were ordered. We had two repeaters set up on Donnelly Dome that provided good communication on the incident

The Deltana Fairgrounds was a great location for the ICP, with electricity, water and internet onsite and plenty of room for expansion if needed. Tables and chairs were also provided for our use.

#### *Notable Successes*

Communications had limited obstacles. The COMT was able to fill the job of COMT and COML, and we were able to hold off ordering an INCM or RADO until operations dictated the need. COMT was able to coordinate with the AFS Radio Shop, and they determined that a cell tower site west of Donnelly Dome would offer comprehensive coverage for the fire operations area. Communications would highly recommend this site for future fire use. They also determined that a site near the Shaw Creek Boat Launch would offer similar coverage from the north, and would offer a great opportunity to link the two repeaters.

## Communications Unit

#### *Notable Successes*

Communications was able to be cost effective during the fire. It was able to start up its unit and run effectively for five days with only a COMT before an INCM was ordered. An ABRO was ordered on the 10th day.

The system created was effective for the entire fire area and experienced no significant issues.

There were no medical emergencies. A simulation was performed and the INCM had no issues handling the call.



### *Significant Challenges and Resolutions*

Due to colder weather in the mornings and lack of solar panels for the repeaters, batteries drained faster than normal. On the fifth day, there was a period of about 20 minutes when communications were poor. It went back to normal after a battery change. CMD 7 was installed a day later as a contingency of losing coverage in the north. Batteries were checked more frequently to ensure sufficient power was available.

Due to spotty coverage in camp, remote sites were set up in Communications and Operations. Larsen Antennas were set up at Helibase and in the briefing area. Because of instances of instances batteries died during briefing, a radio and extra battery were designed for morning briefing.

## **Supply Unit**

### *Notable Successes*

The AFS cache, as well as AFS transportation – and fuel shop when the team needed an extra driver and vehicle – were extremely receptive and helpful. They worked with the team on priority items and helped coordinate when there was a shortage of support due to miscommunications about necessary support staffing.

### *Significant Challenges and Resolutions*

A T2 mobile cache van was ordered on initial request for supplies before mobilizing to Delta Junction. It wasn't until the logistics unit arrived at the ICP at the fairgrounds and noticed the lack of cache van that it was relayed the order had been cancelled. This caused a last minute rush to get necessary supplies to support operations, as well as massive delay in setup, and could have easily been avoided with better communication with the unit.

Pushback about cost from orders placed by units caused delays in getting necessary items and resulted in time finding alternate solutions in cases where the delays were unacceptable. Lack of a single line of communication with the agency, complicated with multiple ordering contacts, created confusion.

Orders were placed and were immediately questioned and asked for justification. This also caused unnecessary delay and confusion.

The AFS cache as well as AFS transportation (and fuel shop when we needed an extra driver and vehicle) were extremely receptive and helpful. They worked with us on priority items and helped coordinate when there was a shortage of support due to miscommunications about necessary support staffing.

An incident occurred where a supply truck with priority items (it was communicated that it was absolutely NOT to be delayed in leaving the supply cache) was delayed over an hour and a half due to someone holding up the truck to throw an item on. This happened one other time earlier in the incident as well – but during a period where the fire activity was comparatively low.



Miscommunications happened between agencies – specifically between DOF and BLM when it came to outfitting the Fairbanks Crew. Differences in outfitting SOPs may be the cause of this. It was assumed they would be outfitted from the AFS cache, instead they were prepared by DOF.

Procurement was understaffed and caused multi-day delays in us getting local purchase items, it seems like this could have been easily avoided by getting extra help to her.

There were double orders being brought in from the field, a line order form was added to the daily IAP to help streamline orders to supply.

Lack of Ground Support hurt supply in its mission to get orders out as quickly as we would have liked. The decision was made when activity picked up to move the main supply down to Arkansas Helibase. This effort was delayed a bit by the necessity of getting a forklift that could handle the terrain.

## **Medical Unit**

Some key decisions were to support fire line crews and personnel early on utilizing fire medics with expanded scope skills and ALS equipment. No reportable injuries or illnesses, 83 patient contacts, 60 Preventative, 6 Headache, 3 Heartburn, 4 Eye Problem, 2 foot problems, and 8 soft tissue injuries.

### *Notable Successes*

Mock medical exercise successfully completed in the beginning of the incident allowed the team to identify potential communication and operational issues, ensuring the team's functional response. MEDL trainee ordered as priority trainee to address critical shortage in Alaska.

### *Significant Challenges and Resolutions*

It was difficult to run daily medical operations and provide a confidential and quiet area for patients to be treated and to recuperate. The issue was unresolved but through professional conduct and positive work attitudes from the entire logistics team we were able to make it work.

## **Facilities Unit**

### *Notable Successes*

The Deltana Fairgrounds was used as the ICP for the Oregon Lake Fire. The fairgrounds functioned as an excellent location for the ICP. We had adequate space for camping multiple crews and overhead. Three buildings were used for office space and one was used for supply. There was ample room for parking. An onsite well, has been tested and returned satisfactory results. Electricity was on site, as well as internet. There was adequate space to support an expanded incident. Cell phone service in the area was uninterrupted. Trash cans, tables, and chairs were available for use at the fairgrounds. Portable toilets and hand wash stations were rented from a local vendor with service on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. A 30 yard dumpster was rented from a local vendor with dumping available on call.

A separate land use agreement was required to utilize the Lions Club Building for additional space. There was adequate space to support an expanded incident.



No camp crew was utilized on this incident.

Increased fire activity resulted in Arkansas Helibase being established at the shooting range on Willis Road, 1/10 mile south of Mile Post 262, Richardson Highway. Two buildings were made available for supply. Electricity was onsite, as well as two phone lines. Portable toilets were rented from a local vendor, as well as a 30 yard dumpster. A local vendor was utilized to provide a 2000 gallon water tender for dust abatement at Arkansas Helibase. Water is drafted from the river near the cargo area of the helibase.

Fuel was procured at Buffalo Center Service Gas Station via fuel logs. Ice was been purchased as needed at the IGA Food Cache with a credit card.

### ***Significant Challenges and Resolutions***

Because there was only one FACL on the initial order, it took extra time to set up ICP. To resolve this, a second FACL or BCMG should be included on the initial order to transport the Facilities Kit and set up. Also with the move of the FACL and BCMG the Equipment truck should be on the initial ordered. This will also expedite the set up process.

When we arrived, internet was not connected, and the water test for the well was not arranged. This could be resolved by including this in the initial order.

### **Food Unit**

There was no food unit on the incident. Resources were on per diem and ate locally.

### **Ground Support Unit**

There was no Ground Support Unit on the incident. Transportation needs were handled through AFS Transportation shop.

## **Finance**

### **Summary**

When the team mobilized for this incident as a short type 2 team, the Finance Section was asked to take trainees to fill the majority of the positions. This finance section was staffed with FSC2, COST and three trainees – TIME (t), COMP (t) and EQTR (t), who also filled the PTRC (t) position. There was limited resources to track in e-iSuite, with the exception of the overhead team and one crew until the decision was made to take action on the incident. As with every incident, there will be a few unknowns to the finance section that will appear after we have been demobilized. A complete Finance Final Incident Package will be reviewed with Paula McQuestion, INBA for the BLM AFS Military Zone, following the national standards. The e-iSuite database will be electronically uploaded to the National Repository as per national direction by the CTSP.

Personnel in the finance section to contact if there are any questions:



FSC2 Barb Haxby, 360-601-8820, [barbhaxby@aol.com](mailto:barbhaxby@aol.com)

COST Jim Eleazer, 907-205-8687, [jim.eleazer@alaska.gov](mailto:jim.eleazer@alaska.gov)

## Time Unit

- Throughout this incident, the two-person Time Unit was responsible for tracking time for the following resources:
  1. 1 government crew
  2. 39 Overhead
  3. 5 rental trucks
  4. 1 Nodwell
- Miscellaneous camp services under commercial contract were tracked for informational and training purposes.
- There were a total of 59 people assigned and reporting time to this incident between May 5 and May 12. Five ordered overhead did not check in or provide time to incident finance, and appeared to be working offsite.
- All excessive hours worked were justified by travel and ICP setup, and mitigated as soon as possible. Copies of these reports are located in the Finance Incident Package / Time Section.
- A batch of OF-288s for Forest Service ADs were transmitted to ASC electronically, with the transmittal letter filed in front of the Personnel Time Unit records. All copies of the Crew Time Reports and the OF-288 Timesheets, as well as Equipment Payment Packages, are on file in the Finance Incident Package. There are no known time issues outstanding.

## Cost Unit

- IT did a great job setting up the database and keeping it operating flawlessly, consequently COST had no frustration with the database.
- One entire 16-hour day was devoted to preparing eight different cost projections for the strategic alternatives presented.
- Costs were kept on a daily basis per the e-iSuite training manual and in accordance with the unofficial national standard. Daily costs were submitted to plans for entry into the 209 Report each afternoon.
- Copies of Daily Summary Report, Weekly Summary and Accumulative Cost of Personnel reports are located in the Finance Incident Package.
- The entire e-iSuite database was electronically submitted to the National Repository as per national policy by the Alaska team CTSP.
- The daily accrual reports were completed and uploaded on a daily basis to Albuquerque. All Daily Accrual Reports and Accrual Summary Detail reports are can be found in the Finance Incident Package/Cost section. There was no Cost Apportionment required on this incident.
- Also completed on a different day was a cost comparison of meals, per diem versus OLAS caterer compared to local meal vendor versus Fresh Food Box A versus MRE. Lastly, the COST compared mobilizing a PNW IMT2 versus extending the AK IMT2.



## Cost Containment

- A guesstimate of 14 days' cost savings is \$830,000. Calculated savings are \$692,000 increased by 20% for the things that are documented but not quantified.
- A short IMT2 was ordered for the incident. It had all the expertise necessary to accomplish the objectives.

	People	7 days
IMT2 Long	55	\$381,150
IMT2 Short	27	\$187,110
Savings		\$194,040

- AFS allowed the team use of exclusive use fixed wing aircraft (11N and 0FW) as well as the type 3 helicopter (405AE) so the incident paid for flight time only for all aircraft.

	HEL3	CWN	405AE	CWN	405AE	Savings
Availibility	\$5,000			\$35,000	\$0	
Flt. time	\$1,800	\$1,020		\$12,600	\$7,140	
				\$47,600	\$7,140	\$40,460

- Heli-base operations were initially consolidated with Delta Forestry saving the cost of a heli-base LUA, porta-potties, hand wash stations and servicing of both.
- The IC mandated maximum 14-hour days early during the incident. This resulted in a savings of \$100/person/day for ICP personnel.
- The decision was made to keep all people on per diem rather than order a caterer or create a meals plan with local vendors. State employee meals per diem is \$60 per day. Federal employees are \$91 per day.

	Number	Unit Cost	TTL Cost	Morale and Concerns
<b>Caterer</b>	daily minimum		\$6,000 need FUDL	Very high, prepared meals and beverages
State PD	10	\$60	\$600	
Federal PD	23	\$91	\$2,093	
<b>PD</b>			\$2,693	High, many choices, TA administration
<b>Local Vendor chits</b>	33	\$91	\$3,003 assume minimum is federal per diem rate	Medium, best for those without cash or credit/debit cards, choices may be limited, chit administration in addition to TA administration
<b>Fresh Food Box A</b>	17	\$398	\$2,255 need cut and split firewood delivered	Medium low, need cooking, eating and cleaning support
<b>MRE's</b>	99	\$9	\$911	Very low, OH may request demobe
<b>Local Vendor Delivered Meals</b>			Per Tina Donahue there are no vendors that can handle 99 delivered meals every day.	

- Agency, rather than contract, resources were used primarily on this incident. Examples are vehicles, UTV's and the jet A fuel truck.



- Incident positions such as EQPI and GSUL were handled as needed by existing Logistics and Finance personnel. The EQTR (t) was qualified to inspect equipment so performed the inspection on each piece of private sector heavy equipment hired on the incident.
- Office support was consolidated with Delta Forestry saving on office machines rental.
- Personal and agency mobile phones were used rather than installing a land line telephone system at the ICP. Saving a minimum of \$1000.
- Internet availability was incorporated in the ICP LUA.
- In an effort to contain costs, the information staff utilized their personal supply kits during the incident instead of placing the usual office supply order. Personal and agency cell phones were utilized.
- A decision was made not to order a PIOF to assist the information section while the team was tasked with preparing the requested strategic planning analyses.
- One of the PIO2s needed to leave the incident for a personal family matter. Once it was determined that the needs of the incident did not require an additional information officer the PIO2 was not replaced.
- Information staff's vehicles consisted of an agency owned vehicle, a vehicle acquired through the NERV program and a personal owned vehicle.
- Wooden sandwich signboards, borrowed from the local forestry office, were used instead of requesting new ones to be built.
- Safety requested a Line Safety Officer (SOFR), however the IC advised to allow Division Supervisors to cover this position until either complexity or number of resources dictated a need for additional Safety Officer positions. This was determined acceptable with agreement from Operations and Safety. The cost savings was for the period of May 6-14 was \$6,200 based on one Agency SOFR position working 124 hours at average rate of \$50 per hour. The incident ordered and received an SOFR on May 15 due to an increase in line personnel. An SOFR(t) was ordered on May 16 and received on May 17.
- Utilized COMT Dual role (COML)  
\$344 per day saving.
- Used INCM for dual roles (RADO)  
\$251 per day savings.
- Having the SPUL perform dual roles (ITSS)  
\$448 per day savings.
- Using a trainee as ORDM  
\$258 per day savings.
- Ordering two more Porta-Johns to lessen the cost of daily service to three times a week.  
\$1500 total.
- Opted not to use the LIONS Club building.  
\$400 per day savings.
- Utilized FACL and BCMG as ground support.  
\$344 per day savings.
- FACL and BCMG car-pooling back to Anchorage, saving hotel and airfare.  
\$200 x 2.
- Medical covered by MEDL until Fire Medics were needed for operations.  
\$344 x 2 per day savings.



## Procurement Unit

There was no a Procurement Unit Leader assigned to the incident. The contracting department at AFS provided land use agreements and EERA's to this incident when ordered by the different sections.

The Deltana Fairgrounds LUA will be closed out with the representative on May 14, with the fairground representative. All equipment packages will be closed, audited and delivered to the Military Zone representative. The Buffalo Center Service fuel purchase agreement will be closed out May 14 and Paula McQuestion will be notified for payment of S-24 and S-25.

## Compensation and Claims Unit

This incident utilized Family Medical Center for all small emergencies, even after hours and weekends were available for care to be provided. Fairbanks Memorial Hospital was utilized for our larger emergencies. Our ambulance calls were provided by using the 911 system.

There were no medical or property claims for this incident at this time.

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### ***Sit 209 Daily Reporting***

**Date 05/07/19**

**Cost to Date: \$115,990.00**

**Total Personnel: 52**

#### **Objectives:**

1. Provide for firefighter and public safety through sound risk management, implementation of mitigations, and clear understanding of assignments and associated hazards.
2. Assess, monitor, and implement suppression operations to protect known values including private property, military infrastructure, timber values.
3. Enhance community, cooperators, and stakeholder relationships through timely exchange of accurate information.
4. Develop a strategic plan to include long term planning consistent with agency administrator values, priorities, and objectives. Ensure alternatives provide a high probability of success and identify risk mitigation measures.
5. Ensure cost containment measures are identified, applied, and documented. Integrate cost accountability into every decision.

#### **Values at Risk:**

At the present moment, the fire is not an imminent threat to the identified values at risk in the area. An area of valuable timber exists 7 miles to the northeast of the fire perimeter, and the Whitestone community is 14 miles to the north. Both of these areas are on the same side of the Delta River as the fire.

#### **Operational Period Significant Events:**

The Incident Command Post was established at the Delta Junction Fairgrounds. Aerial reconnaissance of the fire took place in order to monitor fire activity during the Red Flag conditions that were present. Safe access to the existing control lines north of fire perimeter were scouted and identified which are critical due to the extensive UXO hazards in the fire area. The White Mountain T2IA crew was staged for any potential suppression efforts on the fire. The IMT began strategic planning for long-term operations if the fire presents a threat during the remainder of the fire season.



### **Planned Actions for Next Operational Period:**

The fire will continue to be assessed and monitored from the air with the IMT prepared to engage the fire if the conditions necessitate. The existing shear-blade line extending from east to west across where the fire could potentially spread to the north is a critical location for such engagement. Keeping the fire south of this shear-blade line would protect the identified values at risk further to the north. Locations where resources could be safely engaged along this shear blade line in conjunction with aerial firing operations will be identified and assessed. The White Mountain T2IA crew will continue to standby for such future engagement. The IMT will continue work on the long-term strategic planning for this incident. PACE models and Management Action Points will be developed during the next operational shift along with the associated supporting information such as maps, resource requirements, logistical support requirements, and estimated costs. The IMT will begin preparations to brief local unit managers, land managers, and other cooperating and assisting organizations on this long-term strategic plan.

**Date 05/08/19**

**Cost to Date: \$145,832.00**

**Total Personnel: 53**

### **Objectives:**

1. Provide for firefighter and public safety through sound risk management, implementation of mitigations, and clear understanding of assignments and associated hazards.
2. Assess, monitor, and implement operations to protect known values including private property, military infrastructure, and timber.
3. Enhance community, cooperator, and stakeholder relationships through timely exchange of accurate information.
4. Develop a long-term strategy considering values at risk, exposure, and probability of success. Provide strategic planning analysis, decision support, and long-term fire analysis to agencies to aid in determining appropriate strategies.
5. Ensure cost containment measures are identified, applied, and documented. Integrate cost accountability into every decision.

### **Values at Risk:**

At the present moment, the fire is not an imminent threat to the identified values at risk in the area. An area of valuable timber exists 7 miles to the northeast of the fire perimeter, a group of military observation points exists 7 miles to the northwest, and the Whitestone community is 14 miles to the north. These areas are on the same side of the Delta River as the fire and would be most immediately impacted by fire spread to the north. On the north and east side of the Delta River several other areas of values at risk exist. These include Delta Junction, the Fort Greeley area, the Clearwater River area, Tenderfoot subdivision, South Bank Tanana, and Big Delta. The IMT is updating existing information regarding values at risk in the area collected from management teams on previous fires in the area.

### **Operational Period Significant Events:**

Aerial reconnaissance of the fire took place in order to monitor fire activity and map the perimeter of the fire. Safe access to existing control lines north of fire perimeter have been identified which are critical due to the extensive UXO hazards in the fire area. The IMT is prepared to implement suppression operations should the need arise. The White Mountain T2IA crew was staged for any potential suppression efforts on the fire as well as initial attack support for the BLM Military Zone. An incident



radio repeater was setup for communication in the fire area. The IMT continued strategic planning for long-term operations if the fire presents a threat during the remainder of the fire season. Preparations began to brief relevant land managers and agency administrators regarding this strategic plan on 5/10/19.

**Planned Actions for Next Operational Period:**

The fire will continue to be assessed and monitored from the air and ground with the IMT prepared to engage the fire if the conditions necessitate. The existing shear-blade line extending from east to west across where the fire could potentially spread to the north is a critical location for such engagement. Keeping the fire south of this shear-blade line would protect the identified values at risk further to the north. The White Mountain T21A crew will continue to standby for such future engagement and will be prepared to support initial attack operations for the BLM Military Zone. The IMT will continue work on the long-term strategic planning for this incident. PACE options and Management Action Points will continue to be developed along with the associated supporting information such as maps, resource requirements, logistical support requirements, and estimated costs. The IMT will prepare to brief local unit managers, land managers, and other cooperating and assisting organizations on this long-term strategic plan.

**Date 05/09/19**

**Cost to Date: \$198,102.00**      **Total Personnel: 54**

**Objectives:**

1. Provide for firefighter and public safety through sound risk management, implementation of mitigations, and clear understanding of assignments and associated hazards.
2. Assess, monitor, and implement operations to protect known values including private property, military infrastructure, and timber.
3. Enhance community, cooperator, and stakeholder relationships through timely exchange of accurate information.
4. Deliver a long-term strategic plan considering values at risk, exposure, and probability of success. Provide strategic planning analysis, decision support, and long-term fire analysis to agencies to aid in determining appropriate strategies.
5. Ensure cost containment measures are identified, applied, and documented. Integrate cost accountability into every decision.

**Values at Risk:**

At the present moment, the fire is not an imminent threat to the identified values at risk in the area. An area of valuable timber exists 7 miles to the northeast of the fire perimeter, a group of military observation points exists 7 miles to the northwest, and the Whitestone community is 14 miles to the north. These areas are on the same side of the Delta River as the fire and would be most immediately impacted by fire spread to the north. On the north and east side of the Delta River several other areas of values at risk exist. These include Delta Junction, the Fort Greeley area, the Clearwater River area, Tenderfoot subdivision, the South Bank Tanana River area, and Big Delta. The IMT is updating existing information regarding values at risk in the area collected from management teams on previous fires in the area.



### **Operational Period Significant Events:**

Aerial reconnaissance of the fire took place in order to monitor fire activity. Safe access to existing control lines north of fire perimeter have been identified which are critical due to the extensive UXO hazards in the fire area. The IMT created plans for potential suppression operations and is prepared to implement the plans should the need arise. The White Mountain T2IA crew was staged for any potential suppression efforts on the fire as well as initial attack support for the BLM Military Zone. The IMT finalized strategic planning for long-term operations if the fire presents a threat during the remainder of the fire season. This strategic plan will be briefed to relevant land managers and agency administrators on 5/10/19.

### **Planned Actions for Next Operational Period:**

The fire will continue to be assessed and monitored from the air and ground with the IMT prepared to engage the fire if the conditions necessitate. The existing shear-blade line extending from east to west across where the fire could potentially spread to the north is a critical location for such engagement. Keeping the fire south of this shear-blade line would protect the identified values at risk further to the north. The White Mountain T2IA crew will continue to standby for such future engagement and will be prepared to support initial attack operations for the BLM Military Zone. The IMT will brief local unit managers, land managers, and other cooperating and assisting organizations on the long-term strategic plan it has developed. The discussion and decisions from this briefing will shape the future management strategy of this incident moving forward and the IMT will begin implementation of this strategy post-briefing.

**Date 05/10/19**

**Cost to Date: \$251,852.00**

**Total Personnel: 53**

### **Objectives:**

1. Provide for firefighter and public safety through sound risk management, implementation of mitigations, and clear understanding of assignments and associated hazards.
2. Implement firing operations to protect known values including private property, military infrastructure, and timber.
3. Enhance community, cooperator, and stakeholder relationships through timely exchange of accurate information. Prepare and deliver a public meeting in Delta Junction.
4. Provide strategic planning analysis, decision support, and long-term fire analysis to agencies to aid in determining appropriate strategies.
5. Ensure cost containment measures are identified, applied, and documented. Integrate cost accountability into every decision.

### **Values at Risk:**

At the present moment, the fire is not an imminent threat to the identified values at risk in the area. An area of valuable timber exists 7 miles to the northeast of the fire perimeter, a group of military observation points exists 7 miles to the northwest, and the Whitestone community is 14 miles to the north. These areas are on the same side of the Delta River as the fire and would be most immediately impacted by fire spread to the north. On the north and east side of the Delta River several other areas of values at risk exist. These include Delta Junction, the Fort Greeley area, the Clearwater River area, Tenderfoot subdivision, the South Bank Tanana River area, and Big Delta. The IMT is updating existing



information regarding values at risk in the area collected from management teams on previous fires in the area.

**Operational Period Significant Events:**

The IMT briefed the strategic plan it developed to relevant fire managers and agency administrators today. As a result of that briefing, the IMT is initiating suppression operations on the fire. The fire is still entirely located within a military impact area which is off limits to ground and air suppression resources due to unexploded ordinance in that area. Suppression operations will consist of limited burnouts along a previously created control line immediately to the north of the fire in order to prevent the fire spreading north of this control line. Based on current weather conditions and forecasts, this will begin on 5/12/19. The White Mountain T2IA crew was staged for any potential suppression efforts on the fire as well as initial attack support for the BLM Military Zone. Additionally, the IMT will work on mitigation plans for land managers in order to prevent fire spread north of the primary containment later in the fire season as additional fuels become ready to burn after seasonal green-up.

**Planned Actions for Next Operational Period:**

Predicted weather conditions will delay the planned firing operation on a section of the primary contingency line until 5/12/19. Preparations for this operation will continue through the next operational period. The fire will continue to be assessed and monitored from the air and ground with the IMT prepared to engage the fire if the fire begins to spread to the north and threaten the primary containment line. The White Mountain T2IA crew will continue to standby for such future engagement and support initial attack operations for the BLM Military Zone, as well as prepare for firing operations planned for Sunday. The IMT will prepare mitigation plans for the BLM Military Zone to implement firing operations on other sections of the primary containment line when fuel conditions are ready later in the fire season and/or fire behavior necessitates.

**Date 05/11/19**

**Cost to Date: \$301,912.00**      **Total Personnel: 57**

**Objectives:**

1. Provide for firefighter and public safety through sound risk management, implementation of mitigations, and clear understanding of assignments and associated hazards.
2. Implement firing operations to protect known values including private property, military infrastructure, and timber.
3. Enhance community, cooperator, and stakeholder relationships through timely exchange of accurate information.
4. Provide strategic planning analysis, decision support, and long-term fire analysis to agencies to aid in determining appropriate strategies.
5. Ensure cost containment measures are identified, applied, and documented. Integrate cost accountability into every decision.

**Values at Risk:**

At the present moment, the fire is not an imminent threat to the identified values at risk in the area. An area of valuable timber exists 7 miles to the northeast of the fire perimeter, a group of military observation points exists 7 miles to the northwest, and the Whitestone community is 14 miles to the north. These areas are on the same side of the Delta River as the fire and would be most immediately



impacted by fire spread to the north. On the north and east side of the Delta River several other areas of values at risk exist. These include Delta Junction, the Fort Greeley area, the Clearwater River area, Tenderfoot subdivision, the South Bank Tanana River area, and Big Delta. The IMT is updating existing information regarding values at risk in the area collected from management teams on previous fires in the area.

**Operational Period Significant Events:**

The IMT prepared for limited firing operations along a previously created control line immediately to the north of the fire in order to prevent the fire spreading north of this control line. Based on current weather conditions and forecasts, this will begin on 5/12/19. The White Mountain T2IA crew was staged for any potential suppression efforts on the fire as well as initial attack support for the BLM Military Zone. The IMT continued work on mitigation plans for land managers in order to prevent fire spread north of the primary containment later in the fire season as additional fuels become ready to burn after seasonal green-up.

**Planned Actions for Next Operational Period:**

White Mountain T2IA Crew with support from aircraft and heavy equipment will conduct firing operations along a section of the primary containment line immediately north of the fire perimeter. The goal of this operation is to eliminate the ability of the fire to spread across the primary containment line in the fine fuels which extend north from the fire perimeter. The IMT will complete mitigation plans for the BLM Military Zone to implement future firing operations on other sections of the primary containment line when fuel conditions are ready later in the fire season and/or fire behavior necessitates.

**Date 05/12/19**

**Cost to Date: \$354,120.00**      **Total Personnel: 57**

**Objectives:**

1. Provide for firefighter and public safety through sound risk management, implementation of mitigations, and clear understanding of assignments and associated hazards.
2. Implement firing operations to protect known values including private property, military infrastructure, and timber.
3. Enhance community, cooperator, and stakeholder relationships through timely exchange of accurate information. Prepare and deliver a public meeting in Delta Junction.
4. Provide strategic planning analysis, decision support, and long-term fire analysis to agencies to aid in determining appropriate strategies.
5. Ensure cost containment measures are identified, applied, and documented. Integrate cost accountability into every decision.

**Values at Risk:**

At the present moment, the fire is not an imminent threat to the identified values at risk in the area. An area of valuable timber exists 7 miles to the northeast of the fire perimeter, a group of military observation points exists 7 miles to the northwest, and the Whitestone community is 14 miles to the north. These areas are on the same side of the Delta River as the fire and would be most immediately impacted by fire spread to the north. On the north and east side of the Delta River several other areas of values at risk exist. These include Delta Junction, the Fort Greeley



area, the Clearwater River area, Tenderfoot subdivision, the South Bank Tanana River area, and Big Delta. The IMT is updating existing information regarding values at risk in the area collected from management teams on previous fires in the area.

**Operational Period Significant Events:**

The White Mountain T2IA crew with support from heavy equipment started limited firing operations along the primary containment line in order to prevent the fire spreading north towards values at risk. Gusty winds caused several spots midafternoon. At the time of this report, these had merged into a single slopover in grass. Containment of this slopover became the operational priority and due to the potential of it, 2-IHCs, 2-Air Tankers, and 1-Medium Helicopter were ordered to secure the slopover this evening.

**Planned Actions for Next Operational Period:**

Chena IHC, Midnight Sun IHC, and White Mountain Type 2IA Crew will contain and secure the slopover north of the primary containment line with support from aerial suppression resources. They will also secure and patrol along the area of the line that were burned out the previous operational shift. Once this is complete and the weather conditions allow, firing operations will continue to complete the originally planned firing operation.

**Date 05/13/19**

**Cost to Date: \$533,943** **Total Personnel: 101**

**Objectives:**

1. Provide for firefighter and public safety through sound risk management, implementation of mitigations, and clear understanding of assignments and associated hazards.
2. Implement firing operations to protect known values including private property, military infrastructure, and timber. Contain slopover north of primary containment line.
3. Enhance community, cooperator, and stakeholder relationships through timely exchange of accurate information.
4. Provide strategic planning analysis, decision support, and long-term fire analysis to agencies to aid in determining appropriate strategies.
5. Ensure cost containment measures are identified, applied, and documented. Integrate cost accountability into every decision.

**Values at Risk:**

At the present moment, the fire is not an imminent threat to the identified values at risk in the area. An area of valuable timber exists 7 miles to the northeast of the fire perimeter, a group of military observation points exists 7 miles to the northwest, and the Whitestone community is 14 miles to the north. These areas are on the same side of the Delta River as the fire and would be most immediately impacted by fire spread to the north. On the north and east side of the Delta River several other areas of values at risk exist. These include Delta Junction, the Fort Greeley area, the Clearwater River area, Tenderfoot subdivision, the South Bank Tanana River area, and Big Delta. The IMT has updated information regarding values at risk in the area collected from management teams on previous fires in the area.

**Operational Period Significant Events:**



Chena IHC and Midnight Sun IHC were shuttled to the fire today by helicopter. The IHC's along with White Mountain T2IA crew and support from heavy equipment, secured and mopped up the slopover and other areas that were burned out along the primary containment line the previous shift. Preparations were also made to burnout additional sections of the line.

**Planned Actions for Next Operational Period:**

Chena IHC and Midnight Sun IHC will continue mopping-up the previously burned out sections of the primary containment line and the area of the slopover in order to secure those sections of fireline. Preparations for continued firing operations on a portion of the primary containment line will be finalized. Once complete and the weather conditions allow, the White Mountain Type 2IA Crew will conduct firing operations. The IMT will continue planning for further firing operations should the need arise.

**Date 05/14/19**

**Cost to Date: \$631,238    Total Personnel: 102**

**Objectives:**

1. Provide for firefighter and public safety through sound risk management, implementation of mitigations, and clear understanding of assignments and associated hazards.
2. Implement firing operations to protect known values including private property, military infrastructure, and timber. Contain slop over north of primary containment line.
3. Enhance community, cooperators, and stakeholder relationships through timely exchange of accurate information.
4. Reduce potential long-term repair work and associated repair costs through close coordination of line placement decisions and heavy equipment use with resource advisor.
5. Provide strategic planning analysis, decision support, and long-term fire analysis to agencies to aid in determining appropriate strategies.
6. Identify resources to support Initial Attack as requested.
7. Ensure cost containment measures are identified, applied, and documented. Integrate cost accountability into every decision.

**Values at Risk:**

At the present moment, the fire is not an imminent threat to the identified values at risk in the area. An area of valuable timber exists 7 miles to the northeast of the fire perimeter, a group of military observation points exists 7 miles to the northwest, and the Whitestone community is 14 miles to the north. These areas are on the same side of the Delta River as the fire and would be most immediately impacted by fire spread to the north. On the north and east side of the Delta River several other areas of values at risk exist. These include Delta Junction, the Fort Greeley area, the Clearwater River area, Tenderfoot subdivision, the South Bank Tanana River area, and Big Delta. The IMT has updated information regarding values at risk in the area collected from management teams on previous fires in the area.

**Operational Period Significant Events:**

The IMT continued to implement its strategy to confine the fire south of the primary control line by conducting firing operations in order to reinforce the line by removing the available fine fuels in the path of the fire should it spread to the north. Crews prepared for firing operations on the primary containment line west from H-30 in order to prevent the fire from spreading north of this line. Ignitions



for this operation may begin later this evening. Crews also continued to secure the perimeter of the slopover.

**Planned Actions for Next Operational Period:**

The IMT will continue to implement its strategy to confine the fire south of the primary control line by conducting firing operations in order to reinforce the line by removing the available fine fuels in the path of the fire should it spread to the north. Crews will continue firing operations west from the slopover on the primary containment line and a dozer line in order to prevent the fire from spreading north. The slopover will continue to be secured and mopped-up. An additional IHC has been ordered in order to complete firing operations while weather and fuel conditions are favorable.

**Date 05/15/19**

**Cost to Date: \$776,239** **Total Personnel: 128**

**Objectives:**

1. Provide for firefighter and public safety through sound risk management, implementation of mitigations, and clear understanding of assignments and associated hazards.
2. Implement firing operations to protect known values including private property, military infrastructure, and timber. Contain slop over north of primary containment line.
3. Enhance community, cooperator, and stakeholder relationships through timely exchange of accurate information.
4. Reduce potential long-term repair work and associated repair costs through close coordination of line placement decisions and heavy equipment use with resource advisor.
5. Provide strategic planning analysis, decision support, and long-term fire analysis to agencies to aid in determining appropriate strategies.
6. Identify resources to support Initial Attack as requested.
7. Ensure cost containment measures are identified, applied, and documented. Integrate cost accountability into every decision.

**Values at Risk:**

At the present moment, the fire is not an imminent threat to the identified values at risk in the area. An area of valuable timber exists 7 miles to the northeast of the fire perimeter, a group of military observation points exists 7 miles to the northwest, and the Whitestone community is 14 miles to the north. These areas are on the same side of the Delta River as the fire and would be most immediately impacted by fire spread to the north. On the north and east side of the Delta River several other areas of values at risk exist. These include Delta Junction, the Fort Greeley area, the Clearwater River area, Tenderfoot subdivision, the South Bank Tanana River area, and Big Delta. The IMT has updated information regarding values at risk in the area collected from management teams on previous fires in the area.

**Operational Period Significant Events:**

The IMT continued to implement its strategy to confine the fire south of the primary control line by conducting firing operations in order to reinforce the line by removing the available fine fuels in the path of the fire should it spread to the north. Last night, crews conducted firing operations on primary containment line west from H-30 to H-40. The IHC ordered yesterday was shuttled to the fire today.



Construction of a dozer line to the northwest from H-40 started and crews prepared for future firing operations on this line. While this line was created and prepped, tankers and helicopter with buckets checked fire spread and pre-treated areas of concern for future firing operations. Additionally, crews also prepared to resume firing operations east of the slopover on the primary containment line this evening.

**Planned Actions for Next Operational Period:**

The IMT will continue to implement its strategy to confine the fire south of the primary control line by conducting firing operations in order to reinforce the line by removing the available fine fuels in the path of the fire should it spread to the north. The dozer line extending northwest from H-40 will be completed and prepared for firing operations. Crews will then continue firing operations northwest from H-40 on the dozer line in order to prevent the fire from spreading north. Areas of the primary containment line where firing operations were conducted yesterday will be secured and monitored.

**Date 05/16/19**

**Cost to Date: \$ 1,047,045**      **Total Personnel: 130**

**Objectives:**

1. Provide for firefighter and public safety through sound risk management, implementation of mitigations, and clear understanding of assignments and associated hazards.
2. Implement firing operations to protect known values including private property, military infrastructure, and timber.
3. Enhance community, cooperator, and stakeholder relationships through timely exchange of accurate information.
4. Reduce potential long-term repair work and associated repair costs through close coordination of line placement decisions and heavy equipment use with resource advisor.
5. Provide strategic planning analysis, decision support, and long-term fire analysis to agencies to aid in determining appropriate strategies.
6. Identify resources to support Initial Attack as requested.
7. Ensure cost containment measures are identified, applied, and documented. Integrate cost accountability into every decision.

**Values at Risk:**

At the present moment, the fire is not an imminent threat to the identified values at risk in the area. An area of valuable timber exists 7 miles to the northeast of the fire perimeter, a group of military observation points exists 7 miles to the northwest, and the Whitestone community is 14 miles to the north. These areas are on the same side of the Delta River as the fire and would be most immediately impacted by fire spread to the north. On the north and east side of the Delta River several other areas of values at risk exist. These include Delta Junction, the Fort Greeley area, the Clearwater River area, Tenderfoot subdivision, the South Bank Tanana River area, and Big Delta. The IMT has updated information regarding values at risk in the area collected from management teams on previous fires in the area.

**Operational Period Significant Events:**

Yesterday evening the fire made a significant run to the north and west driven by erratic gusty winds from a passing storm cell, but the fire still remains south of the primary containment line. Crews and



heavy equipment adjusted their original plans due to these conditions. Rather than conducting firing operations on a proposed dozer line to the west of H-40, dozer line was created north from H-40 along natural features which then connected to the primary containment line. Firing operations continued into the late evening along this line. Additionally, firing operations were completed east from the slopover.

Today, crews and heavy machinery on the west side of the primary containment line continued firing operations from last night in order to prevent the fire from spreading north in fine fuels. They were also able to conduct direct attack operations in this area due to a change in weather conditions late in the afternoon. Crews on the east side of the primary containment line reinforced and secured sections of line in the area of last night's firing operations as well as mop-ed up the slopover from earlier in the week.

**Planned Actions for Next Operational Period:**

The IMT will continue to implement its strategy to confine the fire south of the primary control line by conducting firing operations in order to reinforce the line by removing the available fine fuels in the path of the fire should it spread to the north. Crews will reinforce and secure previous firing operation lines in both the east and the west and continue mop-up of the slopover. The military observation post area at the western end of the primary containment line will be assessed for potential point protection and/or indirect firing operations if the fire were to threaten that area.

**Date 05/17/19**

**Cost to Date: \$1,276,434**

**Total Personnel: 163**

**Objectives:**

1. Provide for firefighter and public safety through sound risk management, implementation of mitigations, and clear understanding of assignments and associated hazards.
2. Implement firing operations to protect known values including private property, military infrastructure, and timber.
3. Enhance community, cooperator, and stakeholder relationships through timely exchange of accurate information.
4. Reduce potential long-term repair work and associated repair costs through close coordination of line placement decisions and heavy equipment use with resource advisor.
5. Provide strategic planning analysis, decision support, and long-term fire analysis to agencies to aid in determining appropriate strategies.
6. Identify resources to support Initial Attack as requested.
7. Ensure cost containment measures are identified, applied, and documented. Integrate cost accountability into every decision.

**Values at Risk:**

At the present moment, the fire is not an imminent threat to the identified values at risk in the area. An area of valuable timber exists 7 miles to the northeast of the fire perimeter, a group of military observation points exists 7 miles to the northwest, and the Whitestone community is 14 miles to the north. These areas are on the same side of the Delta River as the fire and would be most immediately impacted by fire spread to the north. On the north and east side of the Delta River several other areas of values at risk exist. These include Delta Junction, the Fort Greeley area, the Clearwater River area,



Tenderfoot subdivision, the South Bank Tanana River area, and Big Delta. The IMT has updated information regarding values at risk in the area collected from management teams on previous fires in the area.

**Operational Period Significant Events:**

Today, crews on the east side of the primary containment line continued mop-up of the original slopover and continued securing sections of line where firing operations have been recently conducted the past few days. Additionally, the remaining section of primary containment line extending east to the Delta River were assessed for future firing operations. To the west, crews continued to secure firing operation lines and also finished firing operations between H-50 and H-60 in an area where a brief rain shower delayed firing yesterday. The military observation post area was assessed for future point protection needs, and options for indirect lines connecting natural features were scouted.

**Planned Actions for Next Operational Period:**

The IMT will continue to implement its strategy to confine the fire south of the primary control line by conducting firing operations in order to reinforce the line by removing the available fine fuels in the path of the fire should it spread to the north. Crews will reinforce and secure previous firing operation lines in both the east and the west and continue mop-up of the slopover. The military observation post area at the western end of the primary containment line will be prepared for potential point protection and indirect firing operations from H-60 to the east using natural features where possible. The section of unsecured shear blade line near the Delta River will be prepared for future indirect firing operations.

**Date 05/18/19**

**Cost to Date: \$1,523,876**

**Total Personnel: 164**

**Objectives:**

**Values at Risk:**

At the present moment, the fire is not an imminent threat to the identified values at risk in the area. An area of valuable timber exists 7 miles to the northeast of the fire perimeter, a group of military observation points exists 7 miles to the northwest, and the Whitestone community is 14 miles to the north. These areas are on the same side of the Delta River as the fire and would be most immediately impacted by fire spread to the north. On the north and east side of the Delta River several other areas of values at risk exist. These include Delta Junction, the Fort Greeley area, the Clearwater River area, Tenderfoot subdivision, the South Bank Tanana River area, and Big Delta. The IMT has updated information regarding values at risk in the area collected from management teams on previous fires in the area.

**Operational Period Significant Events:**

Crews reinforced and secured previous firing operation lines in both the east and the west and continue mop-up of the slopover. The military observation point area at the western end of the primary containment line was prepared for potential point protection and indirect firing operations from H-60 to the east using natural features where possible. The section of unsecured shear blade line near the Delta River was prepared for future indirect firing operations. The IMT began preparations for a transfer of command to another Type 2 IMT on 5/21/19.



**Planned Actions for Next Operational Period:**

The IMT will continue to implement its strategy to confine the fire south of the primary control line by conducting firing operations in order to reinforce the line by removing the available fine fuels in the path of the fire should it spread to the north. The military observation post area at the western end of the primary containment line will be prepared for potential point protection and indirect firing operations from H-60 to the east using natural features where possible. The section of unsecured shear blade line near the Delta River will be prepared for future indirect firing operations.

**Date 05/19/19**

**Cost to Date: \$1,673,718**

**Total Personnel: XXXX**

**Objectives:**

**Values at Risk:**

At the present moment, the fire is not an imminent threat to the identified values at risk in the area. An area of valuable timber exists 7 miles to the northeast of the fire perimeter, a group of military observation points exists 7 miles to the northwest, and the Whitestone community is 14 miles to the north. These areas are on the same side of the Delta River as the fire and would be most immediately impacted by fire spread to the north. On the north and east side of the Delta River several other areas of values at risk exist. These include Delta Junction, the Fort Greeley area, the Clearwater River area, Tenderfoot subdivision, the South Bank Tanana River area, and Big Delta. The IMT has updated information regarding values at risk in the area collected from management teams on previous fires in the area.

**Operational Period Significant Events:**

Crews continued to hold sections of line where firing operations were previously conducted. Options for firing operations on the east side of the fire which would connect past firing operations into the Delta River were assessed. On the west side of the fire in vicinity of military observation sites area, crews prepared sites for point protection and assessed options for safe firing operations in that area. Potential UXO concerns outside of identified military impact areas have limited current operations to established road and trail networks while these concerns are investigated further by military personnel later this evening. Suppression repair operations were concluded and the heavy equipment on the fire is being demobed. The IMT is preparing for a transfer of command to the NW 11 IMT2 on 5/21/19.

**Planned Actions for Next Operational Period:**

The military observation post area at the western end of the primary containment line will be prepared for point protection. Options for firing operations in this area will continue to be assessed. Military EOD teams will address UXO concerns near areas of fire operations if any further potential UXO is discovered. All sections of line where previous firing operations were conducted will be held from the winter trail. The section of unsecured shear blade line near the Delta River will be assessed for future indirect firing operation options. The IMT will conduct a shadow day with the incoming NW 11 IMT2 tomorrow and transfer command on 5/21/19 at 0700.



**Date 05/20/19**

**Cost to Date: \$ 1,868,767**

**Total Personnel: 166**

**Objectives:**

1. Provide for firefighter and public safety through sound risk management, implementation of mitigations, and clear understanding of assignments and associated hazards.
2. Implement firing operations to protect known values including private property, military infrastructure, and timber.
3. Enhance community, cooperator, and stakeholder relationships through timely exchange of accurate information.
4. Reduce potential long-term repair work and associated repair costs through close coordination of line placement decisions and heavy equipment use with resource advisor.
5. Provide strategic planning analysis, decision support, and long-term fire analysis to agencies to aid in determining appropriate strategies.
6. Identify resources to support Initial Attack as requested.
7. Ensure cost containment measures are identified, applied, and documented. Integrate cost accountability into every decision.
8. Prepare for transition with NW Team 11.

**Values at Risk:**

At the present moment, the fire is not an imminent threat to the identified values at risk in the area. An area of valuable timber exists 7 miles to the northeast of the fire perimeter, a group of military observation points exists 7 miles to the northwest, and the Whitestone community is 14 miles to the north. These areas are on the same side of the Delta River as the fire and would be most immediately impacted by fire spread to the north. On the north and east side of the Delta River several other areas of values at risk exist. These include Delta Junction, the Fort Greeley area, the Clearwater River area, Tenderfoot subdivision, the South Bank Tanana River area, and Big Delta. The IMT has updated information regarding values at risk in the area collected from management teams on previous fires in the area.

**Operational Period Significant Events:**

Crews continued to hold sections of line where firing operations were previously conducted. Options for firing operations on the east side of the fire which would connect past firing operations into the Delta River were assessed. On the west side of the fire in vicinity of military observation sites area, crews prepared sites for point protection and assessed options for safe firing operations in that area. A military EOD team assessed an unidentifiable object found in the fire area which was determined to not be dangerous. UXO concerns outside of identified military impact areas have limited current operations to established road and trail networks. All heavy equipment and the White Mountain T2IA crew were demobed. The IMT conducted a shadow day with the NW 11 IMT2 in preparation for a transfer of command 5/21/19 at 0700.




**Planned Actions for Next Operational Period:**


Preparations for point protection at the the military observation post area at the western end of the primary containment line will be finalized. Options for safe firing operations in this area will continue to be assessed. All sections of line where previous firing operations were conducted will be held from the winter trail. The section of unsecured shear blade line near the Delta River will be assessed for future indirect firing operation options. The IMT will transfer command to the NW 11 IMT2 tomorrow at 0700.




# Appendix A: Operations Map



# Appendix B: Progression Map




# Appendix C: Ownership Map



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**ALASKA**  
**INCIDENT MANAGEMENT**  
**T E A M**